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ATTORNEY DIRECT-TARGET MAIL SOLICITATION:
REGULATING AFTER SHAPERO V.
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the
abridgment of speech.' Different types of speech, however, warrant dif-
ferent levels of constitutional protection. Commercial advertising, one
type of speech, has never warranted the same degree of protection as
non-commercial expression.2 One particular type of advertising subject
to strict regulation is that of attorneys. Prior to 1977, attorney advertis-
ing was generally prohibited on a nation-wide basis.3 Recently, in Sha-
pero v. Kentucky Bar Association,4 the Supreme Court of the United
States struck down an absolute ban on direct-target mail solicitation.
The Court determined that an absolute ban on this form of attorney ad-
vertising was an impermissible regulation violating the Constitution and,
therefore, could not stand.5
Attorney advertising, generally, is a subject of concern because of
the unique problems it presents. An inherent conflict exists between an
attorney's ethical obligations and a desire to advance self-serving pecuni-
ary interests. The lawyer has the right to exercise his or her first amend-
ment rights, but the public is entitled to protection from overreaching
and deceptive practices. Additionally, direct-target mail solicitation, one
form of attorney advertising, is unique and different from other forms of
advertising. This advertising form is unlike general public announce-
ments, periodical advertising or radio and television commercials because
the recipient has been specifically selected and the communication spe-
cially designed. Yet, the direct-target letter is not really comparable to
in-person solicitation since the reader has more control over the commu-
nication.6 Unregulated, the advertising attorney can engage in unethical
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ... ." Id.
2. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 760-61 (1976). An advertisement is generally a form of commercial speech, designed for
the pecuniary gain of the advertiser. Id. at 762. Non-comnercial speech, which may advance
political ideals, lacks the motivation of pecuniary gain. In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437-38
(1978).
3. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
5. Id. at 1924.
6. See infra notes 312-73 and accompanying text.
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and deceptive practices effectively abusing his or her public trust. How-
ever, even though the potential for harm may be greater than other areas
of advertising, the attorney's speech is entitled to the same protection as
other commercial speech.
When evaluating the constitutional protection warranted by com-
mercial speech the Court relies on the commercial speech doctrine. As
the commercial speech doctrine developed, a four-part test emerged to
decide whether the speech was entitled to constitutional protection. The
test, built upon modem commercial speech decisions, 8 was first articu-
lated in the commercial speech case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York' The Central Hudson
Court held that for commercial expression to fall within the protection of
the first amendment:
It at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we must ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmen-
tal interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.10
Attorney advertising is one form of commercial speech where the
four-part test is particularly helpful. Quidance must be given to agencies
to assist them in advancing reasonalle regulations regarding attorneys'
conduct. Due to heightened concerns involving the attorney's obliga-
tions to society and prospective clients, regulating direct-target mail so-
licitations is an important function of state bar associations.II Continued
validity of the four-part test is important especially now if states choose
to formulate new, permissive regulations on direct-mail solicitations.
In Shapero, the Court correctly concluded that an absolute ban on
direct-target mail solicitation violates the first amendment.12 In arriving
at its decision, however, the Shapero Court ignored the four-part Central
Hudson test, which should provide needed guidance to agencies regulat-
ing attorney advertising, and improperly relied upon previous attorney
7. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
8. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
9. 447 U.S. at 566.
10. Id.
11. In Shapero, the Kentucky Bar Association Attorney Advertising Commission was re-
sponsible for fashioning attorney advertising regulations. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919 n.1 (cit-
ing KY. Sup. Cr. R. 3.135(3) (1988)).
12. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
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advertising decisions." As a result, the Court undermined the efficacy of
the test, thereby removing the guidance it provided to regulating
agencies.
This Note analyzes ethical and other considerations evoked by at-
torney direct-target mail solicitations. The four-part Central Hudson test
is then applied to the regulation struck down in Shapero to demonstrate
that the Court could have found the rule invalid even under the Central
Hudson test, thus showing that the Court could have preserved the test
and its potential benefits to regulating agencies. Finally, this Note sug-
gests regulations to control direct-target mail solicitation consistent with
Shapero.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of Constitutional Protection Accorded
Commercial Speech
1. Early case law
Prior to the 1940's, the level of first amendment protection accorded
commercial speech was unsettled.14 No Supreme Court case ever di-
rectly addressed commercial speech until Valentine v. Chrestensen1 5 In
Chrestensen, Chrestensen was prevented by the municipal police from
distributing handbills in New York City. 6 One side of the handbill ad-
vertised and offered tours of Chrestensen's submarine.17 The reverse side
of the handbill protested the City's action in refusing docking facilities
for his exhibit.1 8 The Court rejected Chrestensen's contention that his
conduct was protected by the first amendment in spite of its commercial
undertone.19 In a brief opinion, the Court defined what came to be
known as the "commercial speech doctrine":
This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating infor-
mation and disseminating opinion and that, though the states
and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in
the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its
13. Id. at 1921-24. See infra notes 374-461 and accompanying text.
14. See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 20.27-31 (1986) [hereinafter R. ROTUNDA].
15. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Schamburg v. Citizens for Better Envi-
ronment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
16. Id. at 53.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 54-55.
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employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on govern-
ment as respects purely commercial advertising.20
This pronouncement was read to permit a commercial speech regu-
lation in Breard v. Alexandria,21 the next decade's important commercial
speech decision. Breard was convicted of violating a local ordinance
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation by selling subscriptions to nation-
ally recognized magazines.22 Raising the first amendment as a defense,
Breard argued that because the magazines sold were constitutionally pro-
tected, the solicitation itself was shielded from regulation. 23 Breard ar-
gued that the special constitutional protection granted to newspapers and
periodicals bootstrapped his activity of selling those materials into pro-
tected first amendment territory.24 The Court rejected his argument, ob-
serving that the underlying profit motive deprived the parties of absolute
first amendment protection.25
From Chrestensen and Breard, emerged a balancing approach used
by the Court to distinguish unprotected commercial speech from the
right to disseminate information and publish.26 In operation, the individ-
ual's right to privacy is weighed against the commercial enterprises'
"right to distribute" and solicit business.27 For example, in Breard,
the homeowner's privacy interest in avoiding door-to-door salesmen
prevailed over the right to sell the magazines.28 The Court noted a
high degree of community concern for protecting "the serenity of
20. Id. at 54 (emphasis added). By printing a public protest message on the reverse of the
handbill, the Court reasoned that Chrestensen's sole purpose was to invoke constitutional pro-
tection for the entire handbill, nonetheless, the Court concluded that the communication was
primarily commercial in nature.
21. 341 U.S. 622 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Schamburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
22. Id. at 624-25.
23. Id. at 641.
24. Id. at 641-42.
25. Id. at 642. But see Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). In this post-Chrestensen
case, the Court acknowledged first amendment constitutional protection for conduct similar to
that in Breard. This case is distinguishable because the ordinance prohibited a religious organ-
ization (Jehovah's Witnesses) from canvassing door-to-door. Id. at 142. The Breard Court
indicated that the ordinance in Martin "was not aimed 'solely at commercial advertising.'"
Breard, 341 U.S. at 642 (quoting Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 n.1 (1943)). See also
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (mere fact that religious literature is sold does
not automatically transfer religious conduct into commercial activity, thus denying first
amendment protection).
26. Breard, 341 U.S. at 644.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 644-45.
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housewives."2 9
In the years following Chrestensen and Breard, the Court began to
recognize that the first amendment protected speech that had some profit
motive but was also political.30 In fact, in New York Times v. Sullivan,31
the Court was easily able to distinguish protected political speech from
commercial speech. In New York Times, a political advertisement was
placed in the newspaper and the publication profited from the sale of
advertising space.32 The Court did not automatically classify the speech
as "purely commercial" simply because there was a profit motive; there-
fore the speech was entitled to some first amendment protection.33
Instead, the Court in New York Times established the "primary pur-
pose test," where the underlying function of an advertisement, and not
merely its form, is analyzed to determine if it is commercial in nature
and, therefore, not entitled to constitutional protection.34  During the
first twenty years after the Court articulated a position on commercial
speech in Chrestensen, the "primary purpose test" was fine tuned, but its
development did not change the Court's position on commercial
speech:35 Commercial speech as commercial speech did not warrant any
specific or special protection.
2. Modem case law development
During the 1970s, the Court began to make inroads into the com-
29. Id.
30. See, eg., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (film maker
entitled to first amendment protection because "books, newspapers, and magazines... pub-
lished and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty
is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should have
any different effect in... motion pictures."); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (mere profit motive in raising money for local initiative made
no difference although petitioner would benefit economically if initiative passed).
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. Id. at 266.
33. Id.
34. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, §§ 20.27-31. If the primary purpose of the speech is
commercial, then including political information in the advertisement will not bring it within
constitutional protection. See, eg., Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled on other
grounds, Schamburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (handbill held
commercial and not subject to first amendment protection even though political message was
included as primary purpose was commercial). However, if the primary purpose of the speech
is political, then it is entitled to protection. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265-66.
35. Compare Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 53 (pure commercial speech not protected even
though political speech extraneously involved) with New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265-66
(political speech protected even though some profit motive involved). But ef Cammarano, 358
U.S. at 513-14 (Douglas, J., concurring) "[the] ruling [in Chrestensen] was casual, almost off-
hand. And it has not survived reflection.")
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mercial speech doctrine and its primary purpose test. In a series of three
cases, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions,36 Bigelow v. Virginia,37 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,3 8 decided within a four-year
span, a new approach to commercial speech was established.
In Pittsburgh Press, a local newspaper accepted gender designation
of employment offerings in its classified advertising section.39 A Pitts-
burgh city ordinance prohibited gender discrimination, and accordingly,
the newspaper was ordered to bring its advertising under the gender-neu-
tral policy.4 The newspaper argued that the city could not regulate
them because even if advertisements were commercial in nature, they
were still entitled to a higher degree of protection than Chrestensen and
its progeny would suggest.41 In upholding the ordinance, the Court did
not reject nor expressly accept the newspaper's suggestion that the prior
decisions were wrong in not affording some constitutional protection to
commercial speech, but noted that:
Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other con-
texts, it is unpersuasive in this case. Discrimination in employ-
ment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial
activity under the Ordinance. We have no doubt that a news-
paper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad
proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.42
If the Pittsburgh Press Court had relied on the primary purpose test,
it could have upheld the regulation as controlling speech that was pri-
marily commercial, because the primary purpose of the communication
was commercial.43 Instead, the Court chose to focus on the underlying
illegal conduct. The Court did not reject Chrestensen but articulated a
newer test: If "the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction
on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation," the state may regu-
late.' Thus, the Court shifted its primary focus away from the pure
commercial/profit nature of this transaction and centered on the illegal-
36. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
37. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
38. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
39. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 379.
40. Id. at 380-81.
41. Id. at 388.
42. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
43. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265-66 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942)); see also R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, §§ 20.27-31.
44. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389.
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ity of the underlying act.4 5
Two years later, in Bigelow, the Court found broad constitutional
protection available for commercial speech involving legally protected
activities." After a New York family planning clinic advertised abortion
services in a University of Virginia student newspaper, the editor was
convicted under a state statute forbidding such advertisement. 47 While
on appeal, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Roe v.
Wade," which limited the states' ability to regulate abortions.49 Thus
the underlying conduct in Bigelow-legal abortions-was determined by
the Court to be a specially protected activity. In overturning Bigelow's
conviction and invalidating the statute, the Court virtually overruled
Chrestensen by stating that:
[T]he holding [in Chrestensen] is distinctly a limited one: the
ordinance was upheld as a reasonable regulation of the manner
in which commercial advertising could be distributed. The fact
that it had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not
mean that Chrestensen is authority for the proposition that all
statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from
constitutional challenge. The case obviously does not support
any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per
se.5
0
While Pittsburgh Press expressly permitted government regulation of
commercial advertising of illegal activity,51 the Bigelow Court found the
questioned speech to be constitutionally protected if the conduct that the
speech encouraged was legal.52 In the final portion of the Bigelow opin-
ion, the Court acknowledged for the first time that "[t]he policy of the
First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion" even
in purely commercial advertisements. 3
In the final case, Virginia Pharmacy, the Court was presented with a
45. Id.
46. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 828.
47. Id. at 812-15.
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Id. at 153.
50. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819-20.
51. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388-89 (concluding that regulation of illegal advertise-
ment a constitutional practice). See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
52. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 828-29.
53. Id. at 829. Dissemination of information has become an important underlying theme
in attorney advertising cases. For example, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1918
(1988), the Court stated that" 'the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to
justify imposing"' the cost of regulation on the state bar associations. Id. at 1924 (quoting
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)).
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commercial advertising case involving neither an illegal nor a specially
protected activity. In Virginia, a pharmacist was subject to discipline
for advertising the price of prescription drugs.5 s The regulation was
challenged by a group of consumers who required prescription drugs and
wanted the benefit of price comparison. 6 The advertisement of prescrip-
tion drugs did not involve either underlying illegal conduct or a specifi-
cally protected activity. 7 Rather, the advertisement was pure
commercial speech: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y
price." In holding the Virginia regulation invalid the Court noted that
the "notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the
scene" in Bigelow. 9
In effect, the Court's holding in Virginia Pharmacy finally overruled
Chrestensen and its progeny, while reserving three important areas of
regulation in the area of commercial speech for the states.60 First, stan-
dard time, place and manner restrictions, if content neutral, are generally
valid in all types of speech cases as long as significant government inter-
ests are served.61 Second, if the speech is false, misleading or untruthful,
54. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760-61. This was the first case to reach the Court
where commercial speech was analyzed as a distinct form of speech. See Breard, 341 U.S. at
641-42 (rejecting argument that underlying activity bootstrapped petitioner's commercial ac-
tivity into constitutional protection); Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389 (upholding regulation
because advertisement involved illegal act-discrimination); Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826-27 (in-
validating regulation as underlying activity worthy of special constitutional protection).
55. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 752.
56. Id. at 753-54.
57. Id. at 760-61. This is unlike Pittsburgh Press, where the underlying gender-based dis-
crimination was illegal. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389. The facts are not like Bigelow,
where the procurement of abortions under certain circumstances was expressly protected and
legal. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826-27. The conduct in Virginia Pharmacy was purely commercial.
Id. at 759-60.
58. Id. at 761.
59. Id. at 759.
60. Id. at 771.
61. Id.; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (anti-noise ordinance
prohibiting loud disturbances near school not violative of first amendment as regulation con-
tent neutral and designed to further significant governmental interest-preventing disruption
of class work); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft card not protected
speech under first amendment). Time, place and manner regulations are designed to control
the circumstances surrounding the speech, but not the content of the speech. Linmark Assocs.
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (local ordinance prohibiting the posting of
"for sale" and "sold" signs violates first amendment and not content neutral). When the con-
tent is regulated because of overly extensive time, place and manners restrictions, the regula-
tion will generally not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board may not exclude and
discriminate between speakers at meetings); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (ordinance prohibiting picketing near school, but exempting labor pickets made imper-
missible distinction and thus violated the Constitution).
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then under all circumstances it is unprotected and subject to regulation.62
Finally, if the underlying product or service is illegal, the advertisement
may be banned.63
Thus, from the Court's decision in Virginia Pharmacy, a very differ-
ent commercial speech doctrine emerged: No longer were the profit mo-
tives of the advertiser conclusive. Instead the Court examined the nature
of the advertisement and the government interests served by the regula-
tions to determine the regulation's validity. Speech, however, that is pri-
marily commercial would still trigger a different set of regulations than,
for example, political speech."
Although Virginia Pharmacy elevated the protection afforded com-
mercial speech, it remains less protected than political speech.65 The
state may continue to regulate, but not prohibit outright, the dissemina-
tion of truthful information about lawful commercial activities. 6 The
Virginia Pharmacy Court reserved decision on questions involving the
problems inherent in attorney advertising. 7
3. Development of case law involving attorney advertising
The year following Virginia Pharmacy, 1977, brought the first
Supreme Court decision involving lawyer's advertising directed to the
general public, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.68 Bates, an attorney, and
his law partner opened a low cost legal clinic in Phoenix serving middle
to lower middle class residents. 9 In an effort to attract business, they
ran a single-column newspaper advertisement offering their legal serv-
62. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
63. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772-73; see also Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388; supra
notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
64. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; see also R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.31
at 143-44. Courts have traditionally strictly scrutinized regulations of political speech. See,
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
65. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758-61.
66. Id. at 771 n.24; see also R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.31.
67. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. The Court noted the particular issues in-
volved in professional advertising, including situations involving attorneys. However, the
Court reserved the resolution of these issues for another day. Id.
68. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In other cases, the Supreme Court has dealt with issues periph-
eral to attorney advertising. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (bar
associations listing suggested minimum fees for standard legal tasks violated Sherman anti-
trust Act); United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (union referral of
members to lawyers did not violate lawyer's ethical standards); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) (attorney's action of soliciting clients for civil rights lawsuits entitled to constitu-
tional protection).
69. Bates, 433 U.S. at 354.
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ices.70 The State Bar of Arizona disciplined the two attorneys for specifi-
cally violating a state supreme court rule prohibiting attorney newspaper
advertisements.71 In Bates, the Court held that the Arizona "disciplinary
rule [was] violative of the First Amendment [and] might be said to flow a
fortiori from [Virginia Pharmacy].'7 2 In the Court's view, advertising
for certain standardized legal services was allowed. However, the Court
reaffirmed clearly permissible advertising limitations set out in Virginia
Pharmacy.73 Regulations could address time, place or manner, and re-
strain false, deceptive or misleading advertising.74
It is clear from the Bates opinion that the Court did not view a
newspaper advertisement that merely stated costs of specific standardized
services as a threat to the ethical constraints in the legal system. In fact,
the Court dismissed the practicing bar's six specific concerns that adver-
tising would erode the legal profession75 by stating:
with advertising, most lawyers will behave as they always have:
70. Id. The advertisement read, in part: "DO YOU NEED A LAWYER... Legal Serv-
ices At Very Reasonable Fees.. ." Id. at 385 (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 355-60. The Arizona Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) (incorporated in Rule 29(a) of
the Arizona Supreme Court 17A, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. p. 26 (Supp. 1976)), provided in
part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or his associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city
or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he author-
ize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id. (cited in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977)).
72. Bates, 433 U.S. at 365.
73. Id. at 383 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976)).
74. Id. at 383-84.
75. In Bates, the ABA, as amicus curiae, advanced their concerns of the effects advertising
might have on the bar of the United States. Id. at 368-79. The six areas of concern were:
(1) The adverse effect on professionalism (Court found no connection between advertising
and professionalism-in fact, it believed advertising would advance the profession and its im-
age in public eye.);
(2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising (the Bates opinion focused on
"routine services" such as adoption, uncontested divorce and uncontested bankruptcy as type
of matters attorneys likely to advertise. In such advertisements, Court believed attorneys' ad-
vertisement would accurately quote fees, but the Bates Court did acknowledge that advertising
would not provide a "complete foundation on which to select an attorney." However, Court
reasoned that some information was better than keeping the public in ignorance, and organized
bar could discipline attorneys who misled.);
(3) the adverse effect on the administration of justice (Court disagreed with argument
that advertising would encourage litigation, because burden of any judicial increase would be
outweighed by benefit of newly available standardized legal services to vast majority of popula-
tion who "underutilize" legal services.);
(4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising (Court rejected arguments that over-
head costs would increase and young lawyers would be prevented from establishing practices.
1A TORNEY DIRECT-MAIL SOLICITATION
They will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity
and honor of their profession and of the legal system. For
every attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will
be thousands of others who will be candid and honest and
straightforward. And, of course, it will be in the latter's inter-
est, as in other cases of misconduct at the bar, to assist in weed-
ing out those few who abuse their trust.
In sum, we are not persuaded that any of the proffered
justifications rise to the level of an acceptable reason for the
suppression of all advertising by attorneys.76
Simply stated, the Bates Court overruled an absolute ban on attor-
ney advertising, yet termed its own holding narrow. 77 The Court re-
served the issues presented by the "peculiar problems associated with
advertising claims relating to the quality of legal services" and issues in-
volved with "in-person solicitation of clients.., or in any other situation
that breeds undue influence-by attorneys.
'78
The Bates decision brought significant changes to the practice of law
and was met with mixed reaction in the national legal community.
7 9
Bates, however, only scratched the surface of the subject and left many
issues unresolved. 0 The following year, the Court defined the outer lim-
its of permissible attorney advertising in two separate decisions: In Re
Primus81 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.82 At one end of the
spectrum, Primus defined what type of attorney advertising the state
New legal market tapped by advertising would offset additional overhead cost of advertising
and give young lawyer an opportunity to attract his or her own client base.);
(5) the adverse effect of advertising on the quality of service (Court simply stated that,
"[r]estraints on advertising, however, are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work.");
(6) the difficulties of enforcement (since lawyers are obliged to conform to established
ethical standards and are self policing, they will conform and report their colleagues.). Id. at
368-79.
76. Id. at 379.
77. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he constitutional issue in this case is only whether the
State may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertising concerning
the availability and terms of routine legal services." Id.
78. Id. at 366 (emphasis in original).
79. See Bach, The Bach's Score, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 21, 1977, at 12, col. 1.
80. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. The Bates Court determined that an absolute ban on attorney
advertising was impermissible, but left the door open for regulation and possible restraint of
false, deceptive or misleading advertising. Id. After Bates it was clear an absolute ban would
not be allowed, the states would be permitted to regulate, and in some circumstances, even ban
forms of advertising. Similarly, advertising in the "electronic broadcast media" was deemed to
"warrant special consideration." Id.
81. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
82. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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could not regulate.8 3 At the other extreme, Ohralik indicated that the
state could regulate certain attorney advertising and could even ban in-
person solicitation. 4
Primus involved an attorney in private practice who dedicated a
portion of her time to working for the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU)." Attorney Primus, while representing the ACLU, attended a
meeting with a welfare mother who had been sterilized as a condition of
continued medical assistance under a federal program. 6 Following the
meeting, Primus wrote to the woman on behalf of the ACLU and offered
to represent her without cost in a lawsuit against the doctor."' Primus
was charged with unethical solicitation and violations of the state's ca-
nons of legal ethics.88
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the majority, separated this case from traditional commer-
cial speech because it involved special circumstances-Primus lacked any
motive for pecuniary gain.8 9 The Court stated that Primus' letter fell
within the "generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for
associational freedoms." 90 The Court concluded that a state could not
punish a lawyer, who, seeking to further political and ideological goals
through associational activity, including litigation, advises a lay person of
her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter that free legal assist-
ance is available from a non-profit organization. 91 The Court reasoned
that in this context, the lawyer is entitled to the protection reserved for
political expression, demanding a more exacting scrutiny.92 If the sub-
ject communication "simply 'propose[d] a commercial transaction'" and
not political expression, the state could regulate it.93 The letter was ana-
lyzed only for its associational freedom values, and not as a direct-mail
solicitation. 94 The Court intimated that a direct-target mail solicitation
83. Primus, 436 U.S. at 431.
84. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468.
85. Primus, 436 U.S. at 414-15.
86. Id. at 415.
87. Id. at 416-17.
88. Id. at 417.
89. Id. at 422.
90. Id. at 431.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 432. Primus is similar to NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), where the
Court permitted NAACP attorneys and staff members to solicit prospective litigants to ad-
vance important constitutional causes, including desegregation. Id. at 443-44.
93. Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-38 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations




letter would present a problem not addressed by the Court.95 However,
in this case the conduct involved no pecuniary gain, was political in its
roots, and accordingly, was not subject to the same treatment as com-
mercial speech.96
The Primus decision did not merely distinguish between commercial
speech, political speech and the constitutionality of regulating; it also ac-
knowledged that a state has a special interest in regulating its attorneys. 97
When the attorney is acting for a pecuniary gain, the regulators may
"fashion reasonable restrictions with respect to the time, place, and man-
ner of solicitation by members of its Bar."9" However, when the attorney
exercises associational, non-pecuniary based freedoms, the commercial
speech rule does not apply.99
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, °° decided on the same day as
Primus, illustrates how far the state can permissibly regulate. Ohralik
involved an Ohio lawyer who, uninvited, visited a young accident victim
in the hospital. 101 The attorney then visited a second victim at her home
and concealed a small tape recorder under his jacket to insure evidence of
the client's consent to representation. 102 Shortly after coercing both per-
sons to agree to representation, the attorney was discharged by his "cli-
ents" and their parents.10 3 Disciplinary charges were filed against the
petitioner for violating a rule of professional responsibility that prohib-
ited direct in-person solicitation of clients."° The Ohio Supreme Court
reviewed the case and ordered the attorney indefinitely suspended from
practicing law.105 This sanction was upheld by the Supreme Court of the
95. Id. at 435-36.
96. Id. at 439.
97. Id. at 438.
98. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)).
99. Id. at 439.
100. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
101. Id. at 450.
102. Id. at 450-51.
103. Id. at 451-52. Attorney Ohralik did not willingly agree to discontinue representing the
accident victims, even after his discharge. Id. at 452. Ohralik subsequently made it difficult
for the two victims to recover by refusing to endorse the settlement drafts issued by the insurer
until his fee was paid. Id. at 452 n.5. He also insisted on payment under the one-third contin-
gency fee agreement, and even filed suit against one of his former "clients" for non-payment.
Id. at 452.
104. Id. at 453. The Ohio disciplinary rules are fashioned after the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility promulgated by the American Bar Association. DR 2-104(A) provides,
in pertinent part, that "a lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a lay-person...
shall not accept employment resulting from that advice." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RE PONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A)(1981)(emphasis added).
105. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453-54.
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United States. 106
The Chralik Court recognized that under certain circumstances,
regulations that ban attorney advertising or solicitation may not violate
the first amendment. 107 In-person solicitation of clients for pecuniary
gain is a classic example of the type of conduct warranting a so-called
"prophylactic" ban. 0 8 The rationale of the Court indicated how the
conduct of the attorney in Ohralik made the regulation acceptable and
even necessary:
Unlike the advertising in Bates, in-person solicitation is not vis-
ible or otherwise open to public scrutiny. Often there is no wit-
ness other than the lawyer and the lay person whom he has
solicited, rendering it difficult or impossible to obtain reliable
proof of what actually took place. This would be especially
true if the lay person were so distressed at the time of the solici-
tation that he could not recall specific details at a later date.'0 9
In the final portion of its opinion, the Court indicated that because the
likelihood of harm is particularly high with in-person solicitation, proof
of actual injury from the action is not necessary.' 10
Read independently, the decision in Chralik could be limited to its
narrow holding permitting the state to regulate in-person solicitations of
clients."' Read broadly, however, and in conjunction with Primus, cer-
tain principles in attorney advertising regulation emerge. An attorney
may engage in political speech in his or her professional role, and the
speech will be protected." 2 Yet, states may constitutionally regulate the
attorney's solicitation when it is for pecuniary gain.' 13 The Chralik
Court concluded that reasonable regulations of in-person solicitation,
short of an absolute ban, could be enforced in specific circumstances to
further the "high standards among licensed professionals."" 4 Moreover,
the Court asserted that the "interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental
function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of
106. Id.
107. Id. at 466-67.
108. Id. It is known as a prophylactic ban because no showing of actual injury or damage is
required in order for it to be enforced. Id.
109. Id. at 466.
110. Id. at 468.
111. Id.
112. Primus, 436 U.S. at 432-33; see also Chralik, 436 U.S. at 463 n.20, which restates the
rule as, "a lawyer who engages in solicitation as a form of protected political association,
generally may not be disciplined without proof of actual wrongdoing .
113. Chralik, 435 U.S. at 464.
114. Id. at 460-62.
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the courts.' ",115 Thus, the Court indicated that under narrow circum-
stances, the state may absolutely ban a form of commercial advertising if
the regulation is absolutely necessary to protect the public. 116 For exam-
ple, the Court suggested that solicitations involving "fraud, undue influ-
ence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious
conduct'" could constitute a compelling state interest worthy of
regulation.'
17
After Primus and Ohralik, it remained uncertain exactly what other
types of conduct a state could regulate by implementing an absolute ban
on the speech. 18 In-person solicitation could be prohibited, but Chralik
left unstated what other types of conduct could be regulated. No gui-
dance was given in the first three attorney advertising cases for defining
circumstances which would permit a state to regulate attorney advertis-
ing short of situations involving in-person solicitation. 119
B. The Modern Test for Commercial Speech
As commercial speech law evolved, no definitive signal was sent to
regulators precisely outlining where restrictions and prohibitions were
permissive. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,12 the Supreme Court established a clear four-
part test to distinguish which governmental regulations of commercial
speech were constitutional. In Central Hudson, the Court invalidated a
regulation enacted during the energy/oil shortage of the early 1970s
which prohibited electric utilities from promoting the use of electric-
ity.121 Although the regulation arguably advanced important public in-
terests, the Court found the ban on the speech to be overreaching.
1 22
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, established a four-part anal-
ysis for courts to use to determine whether the first amendment protects
115. Id. at 460 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
116. Id. at 467 n.29.
117. Id. at 462.
118. In the three attorney advertising cases to reach the Supreme Court following Ohralik,
no complete ban on advertising has been upheld. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S.
Ct. 1916 (1988), infra notes 212-309 and accompanying text; Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), infra notes 177-209 and accompanying text; In Re R. M.
J., 455 U.S. 191 (1981), infra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
119. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84 ("many of the problems in defining the boundary be-
tween deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved"); Primus, 436 U.S. at 438
n.33 ("[w]e have no occasion here to delineate the precise contours of permissible state regula-
tion"); Chralik, 436 U.S. at 462 ("we need not discuss or evaluate each of these [state] interests
in detail as appellant has conceded that the State has a legitimate.., interest").
120. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
121. Id. at 558-59.
122. Id. at 571-72.
Arl1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
a particular commercial expression. 123 Justice Powell indicated that,
preliminarily, the court should determine whether the speech is commer-
cial.124 If so, then the court analyzes the speech under the following four
factors: (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing-if the speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading, then the
speech is unprotected; 125 (2) whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial-if it is not substantial then the speech is protected; if the
speech concerns lawful activity, and is not misleading, and, then the gov-
ernmental interest must be substantial;' 26 (3) whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the asserted governmental interest-if not, the regulation
fails;12 7 and finally (4) whether the regulation extends further than neces-
sary to advance the asserted governmental interest-if so, then the regu-
lation fails.'
28
The Court's application of the test to the facts of Central Hudson
illustrates the effectiveness of the test. The New York Public Service
Commission (Commission) banned electric utilities from promotional ad-
vertising that stimulated the purchase of energy. The regulation did,
however, allow "informational" advertising, that which was not clearly
intended to promote sales. At the outset, the Court determined that the
123. Id. at 566.
124. Id. The Court carefully noted that the test is reserved for those cases where the speech
involved is "commercial." Id. Other criteria and tests are utilized when the speech is, for
example, political. Generally, higher scrutiny is warranted if the speech is political in nature,
see In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). If, however, the speech is not protected, such as when
the speech is obscene, then little or no exacting scrutiny is necessary to determine whether a
regulation prohibiting the speech is valid. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 13, 24-25 (1973). The
Central Hudson test is intended to be applied to commercial speech regulation. Central Hud-
son, 446 U.S. at 566. A discussion of these different tests is beyond the scope of this Note.
125. If a state or local government is preventing the promotion of illegal conduct, the regu-
lation will be upheld without further analysis. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973); supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. If a
government is attempting to regulate false or misleading advertising, it may do so without
establishing a "substantial interest." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
126. However, once the advertisement involves conduct that is either expressly protected,
that is "not... misleading" or concerns "lawful activity," the balance of the Central Hudson
test must be applied. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975). For a discussion of
Bigelow see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
127. In this second stage of the analysis, a court must invalidate regulations that "only
indirectly advance the state interest involved." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. For exam-
ple, in Bates, the regulation did not advance a substantial state interest by employing an abso-
lute attorney advertising ban to deter "shoddy work" by an attorney. Id. at 564-65 (citing
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977)).
128. In this "ends-means" analysis, the reviewing court determines if the regulation is "nar-
rowly drawn" to "advance the governmental interest." Id. at 566-71. The Central Hudson
decision itself is an example of a valid goal (regulating energy use) sought to be attained by a




speech banned was commercial. 129 The Court noted that there was no
rational reason to suggest that a private, state-authorized monopoly was
not entitled to engage in commercial activity furthered by its advertis-
ing. 130 Regulated industries and professions have been capable of pro-
ducing speech that is promotional, and subject to treatment as
commercial speech. 31 Moving to the test itself, the Court noted that,
under the first factor, the Commission did not advance arguments that
the "expression" in the advertising was misleading or involved unlawful
activity. 132 Second, the Court concluded that the state's interest was in-
deed substantial. 13 3 Two separate reasons were advanced and accepted
by the Court; one involved the need to reduce energy demands brought
about by the "energy crisis," and the other centered on a concern that
the shifting of power usage to "off peak" hours would cause dispropor-
tional rate increases.134 Addressing the third factor of the four-part test,
the Court scrutinized the ban's actual relationship with the two interests
analyzed in the preceding step.13 The absolute ban, the Court con-
cluded, did not effectively advance the state's interest in regulating and
controlling the proportionality of rates.136 Thus, this argument of the
Commission could not be used to uphold the regulation because the
state's interest was not directly advanced. 7 The Court determined,
however, that there was a direct "link" between the advertising ban and
the state's interest in conserving energy.1 38 Finally, the fourth criteria-
requiring that the regulation be "no more extensive than necessary to
further the State's interest in energy conservation"-was not met by this
absolute ban.139 The Court cited numerous examples of alternative, less
restrictive methods available to the Commission for promoting energy
conservation.14 The Court also stated that "[t]he Commission's order
prevents appellant from promoting electrical services that would reduce
129. Id. at 561.
130. Id. at 567.
131. Id.; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyers); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (pharmacists);
and Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1975) (optometrists).
132. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
133. Id. at 568.
134. Id. at 568-69.




139. Id. at 569-70.
140. Id. at 570-71. "It might, for example, require that the advertisements include informa-
tion about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under current condi-
tions and for the foreseeable future." Id. at 571.
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energy use by diverting demand from less efficient sources." 141
The Central Hudson Court intimated that under some circum-
stances, where a "showing that a more limited speech regulation would
be ineffective," a total ban could be upheld. 42 In 1986, the Court upheld
such a ban in Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico. 43 In Posadas, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico banned Puerto
Rican Casinos from advertising within the territory. 44 After applying
the Central Hudson four-part test, the Court upheld Puerto Rico's
ban. 145
The Posadas Court methodically proceeded through the four-part
test, first determining that the advertisement did not involve illegal con-
duct and was not false or misleading. 4 6 Citing the prevention of "dis-
ruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the
fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltra-
tion of organized crime," the Court easily found a substantial govern-
mental interest in regulating the advertising. 47 The Court then
determined that the restriction directly advanced the government's inter-
est.' 4  Finally, the Court found that the ends sought to be achieved
through the regulation were advanced by means carefully chosen to be
no more extensive than necessary to discourage local casino gambling. 149
In reaching its conclusion, the Court analyzed outside factors such as the
social history of local gambling to determine the narrowness of the regu-
lation. 5 Posadas stands as an example of how the Central Hudson test
is an effective and comprehensive tool for determining whether the first
amendment protects a given commercial expression. 5'
141. Id. at 570.
142. Id. at 571.
143. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
144. Id. at 332-33 (citing P. R. R. & REGS. tit. 15 § 76a-1(7) (1972)).
145. Id. at 344. The case involved a local casino which brought the lawsuit after twice
being fined for violating the regulation. Id. The Court stated that once the advertisement was
determined to involve pure commercial speech, the "first amendment analysis is guided by the
general principles identified in Central Hudson." Id. at 340.
146. Id. at 341-42.
147. Id. at 341.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 343-44.
150. Id. at 343 n.8.
151. For other cases applying the four-part Central Hudson test see Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981);
Heffron v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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C. Modern Attorney Advertising Case Law
Following the Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 152 decision, the organ-
ized bar, during the first half of the 1980s began to respond to the signifi-
cant changes in attorney advertising.15 The original Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, originally promulgated by the American Bar
Association (ABA) at the turn of the century, became outdated in the
area of attorney advertising.154 The new Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, adopted by the ABA in 1983, attempted to conform with attor-
ney advertising guidelines set out by the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States.15 For example, attorneys were no longer prohib-
ited from advertising in the media, phone books, or legal directories
available to the public.156 However, traditional prohibitions against so-
licitation were retained. 57 The Model Rules state:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a pro-
spective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when
a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person,
by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by
other communication directed to a specific recipient, but does
not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed
generally to persons not known to need legal services of the
kind provided by the lawyer in a particular manner, but who
are so situated that they might in general find such services
useful.
158
Two cases decided during the first half of the 1980s further defined
the permissible limits of regulating lawyers' commercial speech. 59 In
1982, the Court decided In Re R. M. J 16 In R. M. J. an attorney placed
advertisements in newspapers and the yellow pages, and sent professional
announcement cards to the general public. 161 The advertisements stated
152. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
154. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
155. MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rules 7.1-7.5.
156. Id. at Rule 7.2.
157. The Model Rules retained the prohibition against direct contact with prospective cli-
ents, which includes in-person, telephonic and direct-mail solicitations. MODEL RULES, supra
note 153, Rule 7.3.
158. Id. at Rule 7.3.
159. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In Re R. M. J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982); see also R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.31 at 148.
160. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
161. Id. at 196.
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in prohibited bold capital letters that the attorney was "Admitted to
Practice Before the UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT."' 162 In ad-
dition, Missouri's Rules of Professional Conduct prescribed the precise
language available for advertisements; however, the attorney diverged
slightly from the prescribed language in several practice-area descrip-
tions. 163 The state rules also prohibited general mailings and limited
mailing advertisements to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends and relatives. 6'
The Missouri Supreme Court found that the attorney had violated
the Missouri rules and, accordingly, privately reprimanded the attor-
ney.1 65 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding that
the state regulations violated the first amendment as it applies to com-
mercial speech.1 66 The Court applied the four-part test of Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission of New York,
167
for the first time to a regulation affecting attorney advertising. The
Court stated that "the Central Hudson formulation must be applied to
advertismig for professional services with the understanding that the spe-
cial characteristics of such services afford opportunities to mislead and
confuse that are not present when standardized products or services are
offered to the public."'
68
Under the first factor of the test, the Court found that there was
nothing to indicate the advertisements were misleading or involved ille-
gal conduct.169 Although the Court did not specifically identify any sub-
stantial state interest sought to be advanced by the regulation-the
second factor, it did comment generally on the state's authority to regu-
late its attorneys and protect the public. 7 Instead, the Court focused on
162. Id. (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 196-98. The rule permitted a lawyer, for example, to describe a specific practice
area such as taxation law, tort law and trial practice. The attorney instead used, respectively,
"tax," "personal injury" and "trials and appeals." Id. at 197 n.8.
164. Id. at 196 (citing Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court Rules Mo. REV. STAT.; see
also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(A)(2) (1978) (Index Vol.)).
165. Id. at 198.
166. Id. at 207.
167. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
168. R. M.J., 455 U.S. at 203-04 n.15.
169. Id. at 204-07. However, the Court was not as magnanimous where the advertisement
involved its own rules and regulations:
Somewhat more troubling is appellant's listing, in large capital letters, that he was a
member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.... The emphasis of
this relatively uninformative fact is at least bad taste. Indeed, such a statement could
be misleading to the general public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to
the Bar of the Court.
Id. at 205.
170. Id. at 207. The Court stated: "We emphasize, as we have throughout the opinion,
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the final step of the four-part test, that the regulation be narrowly drawn.
The R. M. J. Court rejected the state regulation as not being nar-
rowly drawn, in part because the record indicated no effort by the state to
regulate attorney advertising in a less restrictive manner."'1 Apparently,
regulators must establish that a prior, more tailored rule failed to accom-
plish their purpose." 2 The effect of this sub-test for commercial speech
offers the regulators an opportunity to qualify the means as least restric-
tive. The State of Missouri, however, had not attempted any other form
of attorney advertising regulation before promulgating the regulation in
R. M. J 3 Accordingly, the Court, citing Central Hudson, invalidated
the regulation and suggested areas for additional, less restrictive
regulations.174
While the opinion in R. M. J. is rather brief, it clearly expanded first
amendment protection for attorney commercial speech. For example, R.
M. J. permitted attorney advertising through mass mailings to the gen-
eral public which, prior to R. M. J, were prohibited. 7 The decision did
not expressly prevent a state from regulating or prohibiting attorney ad-
vertising in other circumstances, especially those where the form of ad-
vertising itself is misleading, or where restrictions short of absolute
prohibition would not have cured any possible deception.
1 76
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel17 7 was the last attorney
advertising case decided by the Supreme Court prior to Shapero v. Ken-
tucky Bar Association.17 1 Zauderer involved an Ohio attorney who was
publicly reprimanded for four violations of the state ethics rules.17 9
Three of the four charges involved a newspaper advertisement placed in
thirty-six Ohio newspapers soliciting clients who suffered injuries as the
result of a contraceptive known as the "Dalkon Shield." 180 The adver-
that the States retain the authority to regulate advertising that is inherently misleading or that
has proved to be misleading in practice."
171. Id. at 206.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 206 & n.20. "There is no indication in the record of a failed effort to proceed
along such a less restrictive path." Id.
174. Id. at 206.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 206-07.
177. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
178. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
179. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629, 636.
180. Id. at 630. The Dalkon Shield is a variety of intrauterine device that was marketed in
the early 1970s. Id. at 630 n.2. The fourth charge involved a newspaper advertising offering to
represent criminal defendants on a contingency basis who were charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol. The ethics rule violated by Zauderer prohibited attorneys from represent-
ing criminal defendants on a contingency basis. Id. at 630 (citing OHIO CODE OF PROFES-
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tisement featured a drawing of the allegedly defective device and read, in
pertinent part:
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sic] Device is alleged to have
caused serious pelvic infections .... If you or a friend have
had a similar experience do not assume it is too late to take
legal action against the Shield's manufacturer. Our law firm is
presently representing women in such cases. The cases are han-
dled on a contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there
is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients.181
The advertisements were successful and brought Zauderer 200 responses
and 106 new Dalkon Shield clients.
18 2
Ohio's Office of Disciplinary Counsel charged the attorney with vio-
lating three different provisions of Ohio's Disciplinary Code with this
single advertisement. 3 First, the code deemed it unethical to offer unso-
licited legal advice, and then accept resulting employment.18 4 The Office
of Disciplinary Counsel claimed that Zauderer's advice concerning a pos-
sible claim against the Dalkon Shield manufacturer and his offer to rep-
resent potential clients violated this rule.8 Second, Zauderer's drawing
in the newspaper violated an express rule prohibiting the use of illustra-
tions in attorney advertising.1 6 Finally, the third violation concerned
certain disclosure requirements relating to contingency fee arrangements
and the client's subsequent potential liability for legal costs of suit.
18 7
In its analysis, the Court applied the Central Hudson test to each of
the violations.18 However, before applying the test to the first count-
offering, unsolicited legal advice in a newspaper advertisement and then
accepting subsequent related employment-the Court rejected the state's
argument that the rationale of Ohralik "9 permitted the state to ban the
advertisement outright.1 90 In Ohralik, the Court had approved the ban-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106(c)). This charge was upheld by the Supreme Court. Id.
at 655. A discussion of the ethical issues involved in certain contingency fee arrangements is
outside the scope of this Note.
181. Id. at 631.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 632-33.
184. Id. at 633.
185. Id. at 638.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 638-53 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). Each area of concern warranted a separate application
of the Central Hudson test. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 556.
189. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-66. See supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Chralik.
190. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641.
[Vol. 22:887
ATTORNEY DIRECT-MAIL SOLICITATION
ning of in-person solicitations because of the possibility of "overreaching,
invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence," fraud and "because
it [was] not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny." ' The
Zauderer Court did not believe that the result in Chralik was applicable
to the facts before it because:
[P]rint advertising generally-poses much less risk of over-
reaching or undue influence. Print advertising may convey in-
formation and ideas more or less effectively, but in most cases,
it will lack the coercive force of the personal presence of a
trained advocate. In addition, a printed advertisement, unlike a
personal encounter initiated by an attorney, is not likely to in-
volve pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-
no answer to the offer of representation.
192
After rejecting Chralik, the Court then turned to the Central Hud-
son test. Applying the test to the first count, the Zauderer Court refused
to address whether regulating this type of advertising did anything to
advance a substantial governmental interest. Instead, as it did in R. M.
J., the Court focused on the final factor-whether the regulation was
narrowly drawn-and found that the absolute ban was not sufficiently
narrow. 193 Consequently, Zauderer should not be read to prohibit all
absolute bans in the area of attorney advertising because the Court lim-
ited its holding to "print advertising ... geared to persons with a specific
legal problem" but distributed in the general public. 94
Next, the Court applied the Central Hudson test to the regulation
banning illustrations from attorney advertisements. 5 Focusing on the
third and fourth prongs of the test, 196 the state believed that its regula-
tion advanced an interest in maintaining "dignity among its attor-
neys." 197 However, the Court held that the regulation reflected no
substantial state interest because dignity and decorum are primarily
191. Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978)).
192. Id. at 642.
193. Id. at 644. The Court also rejected a number of arguments advanced by the state that
attempted to establish circumstances warranting a ban. For example, the printed advertising
does not encourage "meritless litigation," which would have required a ban. Id. at 643.
194. Id. at 641. The Court distinguished Chralik because it was "in-person" as opposed to
"printed," and was directed at an individual's specific legal problem as opposed to broader
advertising, which did not invade "the privacy of those who read it." Id. at 642 (citing Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455 (1978)).
195. Id. at 647.
196. See supra notes 127-28 for a discussion of the third and fourth prongs of the Central
Hudson test.
197. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647.
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proper concerns for a courtroom.19 The Court did not discuss ethical
implications of the attorney engaged in advertising or the obligation of
the attorney not to deceive the public. The Court did acknowledge some
situations create problems with the communication and the public that
could rise to an important governmental interest and regulating could be
necessary. 199 The Court, however, refused to decide if, in those special
circumstances, it would "justify the abridgment of [attorneys'] First
Amendment rights."2"0 The Court concluded that the Ohio rule prohib-
iting the use of illustrations was unconstitutional, but retained the possi-
bility that an illustration as a form of advertising could be regulated in a
less restrictive manner, and policed on a case-by-case basis.20 1
The final regulation the Court considered involved the Ohio rule
concerning advertisements for attorney's services on a contingency basis.
In such advertisements, the attorney must disclose details concerning the
fee contemplated as well as the contingency percentages proposed. In
addition, a corresponding regulation required that such advertising dis-
close that, under Ohio law, the losing party in litigation would be person-
ally liable for legal costs incurred.2 °2 Thus, in essence, the regulations
required that an attorney's advertisement fully disclose potential client
liability.203 The Court categorized the regulation as a "disclosure re-
quirement" imposed on the attorney who elects to advertise.2° Gener-
ally, there is a material difference between disclosure requirements and
prohibitions or limitations on actual advertising.205 Disclosure regula-
tions, the Court stated, were much more likely to pass muster under the
Central Hudson test and be upheld as valid regulations of commercial
speech.2 6 The Court reminded Zauderer that under prior commercial
speech decisions, including Central Hudson, disclosure requirements had
198. Id.
199. Id. at 641. For example, the Court mentioned direct in-person solicitation as present-
ing "unique regulatory difficulties" supporting a substantial state interest. Id.
200. Id. at 648. But even in special circumstances, the Court was not persuaded that undig-
nified behavior would tend to recur so often as to warrant a complete ban. Id.
201. Id. at 649. Presumably, false, misleading or fraudulent illustrations, like any form of
commercial speech, could be regulated and even banned under the Central Hudson principles.
202. Id. at 635, 650; see OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101(A), DR
2-101(B)(15). The Court reprinted the statutes in Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631-33 nn.3-4.
203. Id. at 653.
204. Id. at 650.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 651. However, disclosure requirements may be invalid where they mandate
speech that actually requires the individual to ascribe to a specific political or religious posi-
tion. See, eg., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
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constituted acceptable "less restrictive means" to further the state's sub-
stantial interest.20 7 Since deception was possible in this factual situation,
the Court found the regulation to be a valid "disclosure requirement. '20 8
Accordingly, the Court upheld the attorney's public reprimand so far as
it was limited to the failed disclosure. 20 9
Zauderer did not alter the application of Central Hudson in situa-
tions where the state or governmental entity attempts to regulate attor-
ney commercial speech.210 The four-part Central Hudson test, together
with Zauderer, R. M. J., and the Court's prior decisions concerning at-
torney advertising, helped to establish a framework upon which regulat-
ing agencies could form permissible regulations for its attorneys to
follow. It is against this background that the Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association21 decision is analyzed.
III. SHAPERO V. KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
A. The Facts
Richard D. Shapero, an attorney, wished to directly contact poten-
tial clients by mail.212 He drafted a brief form letter attempting to solicit
the business of clients who were potentially subject to home foreclo-
sure.213 In his letter, Shapero offered a free consultation to the recipient
and volunteered that "[i]t may surprise you what I may be able to do for
you."1214 Shapero intended to send the letter to homeowners against
207. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-51 n.14 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980)).
208. Id. at 652. The Court stated that
[the] State's position that it is deceptive to employ advertising that refers to contin-
gent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability for costs, is reasonable
enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liability for
costs be disclosed.... [N]either requirement seems intrinsically burdensome; and
they certainly cannot be said to be unreasonable as applied to appellant, who in-
cluded in his advertisement no information whatsoever regarding costs and fee rates.
This case does not provide any factual basis for finding that Ohio's disclosure re-
quirements are unduly burdensome.
Id. at 653 & n.15.
209. Id. at 653-55.
210. Id. at 638 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). The Court reaffirmed the Central Hudson four-part test,
verifying its applicability in attorney advertising. Id. at 639-49.
211. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
212. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988). The letter told the recipient
that they might be surprised at what attorney Shapero could do for them. Id. at 1919. See
infra text accompanying note 214 for the text of the letter.
213. Id. at 1919.
214. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919. The entire letter read:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is
true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your
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whom foreclosure suits had been filed.21 5
Shapero applied to the Kentucky Attorney Advertising Commission
for pre-approval of the proposed form letter. The Commission, responsi-
ble for regulating attorney advertising in Kentucky, operates under the
general auspices of the Kentucky Bar Association.2"6 The Bar Associa-
tion, in turn, is directly supervised by the State's supreme court.2 17 The
Commission did not find the letter false or misleading, but determined
that it violated the state's attorney advertising rules that absolutely
banned direct-mail solicitation of prospective clients.218 The Commis-
sion's decision focused on Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
3.135(5)(b)(i)219 which prohibits the practice of directly contacting po-
tential clients who are in need of specific legal services. The decision did
not focus on the content or language in Shapero's letter.220
Shapero then requested the Kentucky Bar Association to review its
rule for possible constitutional defects in light of Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel,221 a 1985 case decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States concerning attorney advertising.222 The Ethics Committee
of the Bar reviewed the rule and, in an opinion adopted by the Kentucky
State Bar, refused to approve Shapero's form letter.22 a The Committee
found that the questioned rule was not unconstitutional because it was
consistent with the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.224 Moreover, the State's Bar Association and
home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more time to pay
them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE informa-
tion on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you.
Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is NO
charge for calling.
Id. (emphasis in original).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1919 n.I.
217. Ky. Sup. Cr. R. 3.135 (1988).
218. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919-20 (citing KY. Sup. Cr. R. 3.135(5)(b)(i) (1988)).
219. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.135(5)(b)(i) reads:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only if
that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whom it is also sent
or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted by a specific
event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct
from the general public.
Id.
220. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919.
221. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
222. See supra notes 178-209 and accompanying text for a discussion of Zauderer.
223. Shapero, 108 S. Ct at 1920.
224. Id. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983), which states:
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Kentucky Supreme Court believed the recently promulgated ABA
Model Rule was constitutionally consistent with the current Supreme
Court of the United States decisions in the area of commercial speech.225
Unsatisfied, Shapero requested that the Kentucky Supreme Court
review the Bar Association's decisions prohibiting his form letter and re-
fusing to invalidate the Kentucky Supreme Court rule.226 The court is-
sued a three-part ruling.227 First, the court held that the challenged
attorney advertising rule conflicted with the ruling in Zauderer, and or-
dered it deleted.228 Second, the court adopted American Bar Association
Model Rule 7.3.229 The court believed the rule was sufficiently narrowly
drawn to constitutionally ban direct solicitation without violating the
first amendment.2 30 Finally, the court reviewed Shapero's letter in light
of the newly adopted rule, and concluded that the practice of direct-tar-
get mail client solicitation was fraught with dangers of overreaching, in-
timidation, and potentially misleading conduct so as to justify an
absolute "prophylactic" ban.
231
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari2 32 to re-
solve the question of whether direct-target mail solicitation of potential
clients may be banned under the first amendment.233 The Court held
that an absolute ban of a lawyer's direct-mail solicitation was prohibited
and did not conform with the commercial speech doctrine.234
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-
person or otherwise when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the law-
yer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or
telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific
recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed
generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the
lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find
such services useful.
Id. (emphasis added).
225. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1916
(1988). The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA in 1983 after several years of debate and
review by the Association's special Kutak Commission, named after the late chair of the Com-
mission, Robert Kutak. See Devine, Lawyer Advertising and the Kutak Commission: A Re-
freshing Return to the Past, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 503 (1982).
226. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920. The Kentucky Supreme Court has the authority to review
a formally adopted Bar Association opinion. Ky. Sup. Cr. R. 3.530 (1988).
227. Shapero, 726 S.W.2d 299.
228. Id. at 300.
229. Id. at 301. See supra text accompanying note 224 for text of the Model Rule 7.3.
230. Shapero, 726 S.W.2d at 301.
231. Id.
232. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987).
233. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
234. Id. at 1924-25. The commercial speech doctrine offers mid-level protection for adver-
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B. Reasoning of the Court
1. Majority opinion
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,235 the Supreme Court held
that an attorney's direct solicitation of clients through the mail consti-
tutes commercial speech protected by the first amendment and therefore,
may not be banned.236 Specifically, the majority rejected the ban on di-
rect-mail advertising provided in Rule 7.3 of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which had been adopted by
the Kentucky Supreme Court.237
Justice Brennan, writing for the Shapero majority, offered several
broad reasons for finding a total bar on attorneys' direct-mail solicitation
unconstitutional. 28  First, the Court applied a significantly watered
down version of the four-part test of commercial speech originally stated
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.239 As previously noted,2' this test requires that rules regulat-
ing commercial speech that is not deceptive, misleading or false be nar-
rowly drawn and advance a substantial state interest.241 As long as the
regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest and is narrowly
drawn to be only as restrictive as necessary, the test permits absolute
bans on commercial advertising.
242
Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court noted the first step-
that the speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading-only
in passing because the Bar Association never claimed that Shapero's let-
ter was misleading, overreaching, false or deceptive.243 The majority
agreed and proceeded directly to the final step of the test.244 The Court
held that the Kentucky Supreme Court rule violated the first amendment
because the regulation was not narrowly drawn to meet a substantial
governmental interest. The Court reasoned that far less restrictive means
tising and other forms of speech where the primary motivation is pecuniary. For a discussion
of the modem treatment of commercial speech, see supra notes 36-141 and accompanying text.
235. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
236. Id. at 1923-25.
237. Id. See supra note 224, for a text of Model Rule 7.3. It is now presumed that Rule 7.3
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is unconstitutional to the extent it bans all direct-
mail solicitation. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924.
238. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924-25.
239. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
240. See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
241. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
242. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920. See supra notes 12141 and accompanying text.
243. Id. at 1919, 1921.
244. Id. at 1919; see also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1987),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
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could accomplish many of the state's goals in regulating abuses.245 In
this particular circumstance, a blank form letter, pre-approved by the
local bar organization could serve in furthering these important goals.2"
The balance of the four-part Central Hudson test and its logic was not
applied.247
Second, the Shapero Court distinguished in-person solicitation from
other written advertising approved in its prior decisions.248 Comparing
the facts in Shapero with Chralik v. Ohio State Bar Association 249 and
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,250 the Court found Shapero's
factual situation more consistent with Zauderer in every respect.25 1 The
Shapero Court stated that the facts did not parallel Chralik because a
writing is not similar to an in-person solicitation.25 2 While the "unique
features of in-person solicitation [present in Ohralik] justifly] a prophy-
lactic rule," the Court stated that these features were not present in di-
rect-mail solicitation.25 3 The Court contended that the distinction is
most obvious from a potential client's perspective, which is significant
since the potential client is the party the state is attempting to protect. If
a potential client is contacted in person, he or she may be impaired, or he
or she may feel overwhelmed by the particular situation.254 On the other
hand, the recipient of a letter can ignore, destroy or defer consideration
of the attorney's correspondence.2 5 The majority also found relevant
the distinction between private, unrecorded, in-person solicitations which
are undeniably impossible to police, and direct-mail letters which can be
retrieved later by an investigating agency for review.25 6
Moreover, the Court noted that prior to Shapero, it had struck down
regulations banning mass mailings to the general public in In Re R. M.
J.257 The Court felt that Shapero was really being punished for his effi-
245. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923-24.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1921-24.
248. Id. at 1921.
249. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
250. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
251. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921.
252. Id. at 1922.
253. Id.
254. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465-67.
255. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
256. Id. at 1923; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641. The Zauderer Court characterized the
in-person situation activity in Chralik as "a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching,
invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence and outright fraud." Id. Further the
Zauderer Court noted that the activity in Ohralik was "virtually immune" from realistic ob-
servation and supervision. Id.
257. 455 U.S. 191 (1981).
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ciency; why should the Constitution prevent the banning of a mass mail-
ing yet allow a target letter to those who could directly benefit from the
attorney's services?2 8 The Court concluded that a written advertisement
does not substantially infringe upon an individual's privacy rights, and
privacy invasion occurs only when the legal problems are discovered by
the attorney, not when a solicitation letter is received.2 19 The majority in
Shapero reasoned that holding the rule unconstitutional was nothing
more than a logical extension of earlier attorney advertising decisions:
As long as the advertisement was not deceptive, misleading or false, the
Constitution prohibits a state from banning such a communication. 2 °
Third, the Court reviewed the issues involved in direct-mail regula-
tion, and concluded that since some less restrictive means appeared avail-
able, the state was not practically limited to an absolute ban to achieve its
purpose.2 61 In this portion of the Court's opinion, Justice Brennan ac-
knowledged that certain problems exist when an attorney directly solicits
clients through the mails.2 62 The Court then proceeded to list alterna-
tives available to the state.2 6 These alternatives included: informing the
recipient on how to report inaccuracies or letters that are misleading;
requiring the attorney to state clearly the nature of a soliciting letter;
and, requiring the soliciting lawyer to retain copies of all direct-mail let-
ters by requiring that the attorney produce the letters at any disciplinary
258. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921. The Kentucky Supreme Court prohibited the letter
"solely because it targeted only persons who were 'known to need [the] legal services' offered."
Id. (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 301, rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1916
(1988)).
259. Id. at 1923. However, the privacy concerns present a rather compelling argument in
favor of an absolute ban. For a further discussion of the privacy issues involved, see infra
notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
260. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921. The Court stated:
Thus, Ohio could no more prevent Zauderer from mass-mailing to a general popula-
tion his offer to represent women injured by the Dalkon Shield than it could prohibit
his publication of the advertisement in local newspapers. Similarly, if petitioner's
letter is neither false nor deceptive, Kentucky could not constitutionally prohibit him
from sending at large an identical letter opening with the query, "Is your home being
foreclosed on?," rather than his observation to the targeted individuals that "It has
come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on."
Id.
261. Id. at 1922-24.
262. Id. at 1923. For example, recipients may believe a lawyer is more familiar with their
specific legal problems than he or she actually is. The Court hypothesized that a recipient
could be led to believe a more serious or "dire" legal problem exists when the situation is really
quite minor or does not exist. Id. (citing Leoni v. State Bar of California, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 619-
20, 704 P.2d 183, 189, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423, 429 (1985), summarily dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986) (attorney sent mass mailings to defendants in all types of civil actions offering bank-
ruptcy information)).
263. Id. at 1923-24.
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proceedings.26 The Court acknowledged that increased responsibilities
in supervising direct-mail letters would be the natural result of a regulat-
ing agency imposing permissible restrictions, but were required because
[o]ur recent decisions involving commercial speech have been
grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial informa-
tion is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regula-
tors the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the
helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the
harmful.265
In the final portion of the opinion only, Justice Brennan, not joined
by a majority of the Court, wrote his opinion of exactly how limited the
states were with regard to regulating commercial speech.26 6 Justice
Brennan began by agreeing with Shapero's argument that his letter was
absolutely protected by the first amendment. 267 He rejected the Bar As-
sociation's argument that Shapero's letter was converted into "high pres-
sure solicitation," and was essentially overbearing. 268  Then Justice
Brennan suggested no limitation would be permitted if the advertisement
is truthful.269 In fact, he stated:
[S]o long as the First Amendment protects the right to solicit
legal business, the State may claim no substantial interest in
restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to
those least likely to be read by the recipient. Moreover, the
First Amendment limits the State's authority to dictate what
information an attorney may convey in soliciting legal
business.
270
Finally, Justice Brennan suggested that he would permit a state to limit
even potentially misleading attorney advertising only if the state could
establish a substantial interest in its regulation.271
264. Id. at 1924.
265. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)). The
Court also rejected the bar association's reliance upon earlier decisions to support bans on
direct-mail solicitation. The case most often relied upon by Shapero was Ohralik v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
266. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924-25. Justices White and Stevens, who concurred with the
Court's judgment, dissented from the final portion of Brennan's opinion. Id. at 1925 (White,
J., concurring and dissenting in part).
267. Id. at 1924.
268. Id.
269. Initially, Justice Brennan stated that pitch, style or typeface would, under no circum-
stances, reach a threshold of deceptive speech as long as the contents were truthful. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. To establish a substantial state interest in regulating, the state would have to show
that the speech is misleading and material. Not all misleading speech involves materiality.
Absent materiality, the advertisement does not invoke a state's substantial interest. Presuma-
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The majority concluded that the State Bar of Kentucky was unable
to establish that Shapero's direct-mail solicitation was misleading.
272
Utilizing the logic of Zauderer, the Shapero Court decided that the regu-
lation failed to further any substantial state interest and, therefore, the
absolute ban could not be upheld.273 The majority remanded the case,
giving the Bar Association an opportunity to establish criteria as set out
in the majority opinion.274
2. Dissenting opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, dissented from the majority's holding that an absolute ban on di-
rect-mail solicitation of clients violated the first amendment commercial
speech doctrine. 275 Moreover, the dissent attacked the majority's rea-
soning, its reliance on Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,2 6 and
generally criticized the commercial speech doctrine itself. Finally, the
dissent criticized the majority for failing to apply the four-part commer-
cial speech test formulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Services Commission of New York.
2 77
The dissent perceived two primary flaws of omission in the major-
ity's reasoning. First, the dissent contended that the Court failed to rec-
ognize that attorney advertising involves conduct that is inherently likely
to mislead the public, at least more so than where the mere "sale of ordi-
nary consumer goods" is involved.27 Where a direct-mail letter is ad-
dressed by a vendor of standardized products, the recipient understands
that the nature of the relationship is merely one of consumer and seller.
Where the relationship is that of an attorney and a potential client, the
public assumes that ethical principles demand that the lawyer put the
client's interest before his or her own; therefore, the situation is ripe for
bly Justice Brennan intended the key element to be "materiality," because Justice Brennan
would not permit regulation of misleading yet "relatively uninformative facts." Id. at 1925. It
is important to note that Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Ken-
nedy, would have significantly limited restrictions on regulating commercial speech. Id. at
1924-25.
272. Id. at 1919.
273. Id. at 1921-24.
274. Id. After the Court's decision, Shapero continued to have difficulty with the proposed
form letter. The Kentucky Bar Association refused to approve at least twelve letters Shapero
submitted, primarily because they were believed to overreach or mislead the recipient. Wall
St. J., Aug. 30, 1988, § 2, at 21, col. 1.
275. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1925 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
276. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
277. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).




Second, the dissent believed that the majority also failed to recog-
nize particular problems involving legal advertising and solicitation.28°
In particular, by its very nature, direct-mail solicitation invites lawyers to
overreach by offering incomplete and not disinterested unsolicited advice
to attract clients.281 The dissent claimed that an attorney is likely to
place his or her own pecuniary interest ahead of the client's goals by
providing advice tailored to secure the client.28 2 Accordingly, the state's
interest is substantial and the state could permissibly ban the form of
advertising.28 3 In general, some forms of attorney advertising have frus-
trated the states' legitimate interest in removing public distrust of law-
yers and the legal system.284 In many ways, advertising has skewed the
public's impression of all attorneys because some have selected offensive
forms of advertising.
Justice O'Connor also took issue with the majority's reliance on
Zauderer. She conceded that Zauderer supported the majority's posi-
tion; however, she argued that Zauderer was poorly reasoned and based
upon faulty premises.285 Zauderer was incorrect because it exceeded the
permissible limitations allowable to commercial speech, and granted
more protection than existed under the Constitution.28 6 The dissent sug-
gested that she would possibly overrule all of the attorney advertising
decisions, if provided with the opportunity.28 7
The dissent further argued that the majority exceeded even
Zauderer in providing unwarranted constitutional protection to attorney
advertising.288 There was, according to the dissent, a higher likelihood
that zealous attorneys' personalized letters would distort the judgment of
lay people than would a newspaper advertisement. 28 9 Further, the
targeted recipient as a member of the general public has few contacts
with the judicial system and is thus likely to be intimidated by the law-
yer's perceived authority. The dissent believed that it is significantly
279. Id. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
280. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
281. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
283. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 1927 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1925-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-47 (1985)).
286. Id. at 1925-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
287. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
289. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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more difficult to ignore a letter than a newspaper advertisement. 290
Justice O'Connor then compared the direct-target mail solicitation
of Shapero with Chralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.291 In Chralik, the
Court prohibited in-person solicitation, but still accepted some degree of
protected commercial speech.292 Justice O'Connor criticized the major-
ity for overlooking the obvious logical similarities, such as the direct and
personal nature of the solicitation focusing on a single individual.293
The dissent then focused on the general flaws in the commercial
speech doctrine. While accepting political speech as the "core of the
First Amendment," the dissent pointed out that, historically "the consti-
tutional fence around this metaphorical market-place of ideas had not
shielded the actual marketplace of purely commercial transactions from
governmental regulation. ' 294 Thus, the dissent claimed that commercial
speech has never held the same constitutional status as political
speech.
295
The dissent also questioned the apparent inability of the majority to
apply the legal test established by the Court in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York296 to the facts of
Shapero.297 The dissent then applied the four-part test and concluded
that the state restrictions were permissive because of the state's substan-
tial interest in protecting its consumer citizens from the potentially mis-
leading effects of targeted direct-mail advertising.29 Justice O'Connor
specifically found that even if the advertising was not unlawful or per se
misleading, the Kentucky State Bar Association had a substantial inter-
est in its regulation.299 Moreover, Justice O'Connor found that the ABA
Model Rule 7.3, adopted in Kentucky, was narrowly drawn to meet
those interests and could constitutionally ban Shapero's direct-mail let-
ters.3°° The dissent did not believe that the regulation was more exten-
sive than necessary because the underlying compelling interest of
protecting the public, demanded such broad restriction.0
290. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
291. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
292. Id. at 455.
293. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 1926-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Boos v. Berry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988)).
295. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
296. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
297. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1927-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 120-41 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Central Hudson four-part test.
298. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1928 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
300. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
301. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The dissent then turned its attention to the flaws in other attorney
advertising cases. It characterized Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 302 as a
problematic experiment which could now fail under the four-part test set
out in Central Hudson.3 °3 The dissent focused on the economic motiva-
tion that prompted many attorneys to solicit legal business through vari-
ous legal advertising techniques. 3° Troubled by underlying economic
motivational factors, the dissent reminded attorneys that:
unlike other occupations that may be equally respectable, ...
membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one's selfish
pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of con-
duct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through
the discipline of the market. There are sound reasons to con-
tinue pursuing the goal that is implicit in the traditional view of
professional life.3°5
Thus, Justice O'Connor supported the state restrictions on attorney ad-
vertising.306 She believed that a lawyer cannot follow the rules of profes-
sional conduct, which separate the legal profession from trades and
occupations, and at the same time advertise legal services to the
public.
30 7
In the final part of its analysis, the dissent criticized the majority's
reasoning that attorney advertising in general, benefits consumers of legal
services and should be considered as protected commercial speech. 0 8
Observing that attorneys are officers of the court, and must place the
interests of their clients above their own pecuniary interests, Justice
O'Connor wrote:
[T]his Court's recent decisions reflect a myopic belief that
"consumers", and thus our nation, will benefit from a constitu-
tional theory that refuses to recognize either the essence of pro-
fessionalism or its fragile and necessary foundations.... In one
way or another, time will uncover the folly of this approach. I
can only hope that the Court will recognize the danger before it
302. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
303. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1929 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
304. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "The best arguments in favor of rules permitting attor-
neys to advertise are founded in elementary economic principles." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); see also Hazard, Peirce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A
Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084 (1983) [hereinafter Hazard].
305. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1929 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 1929-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 1931 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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is too late to effect a worthwhile cure.309
IV. ANALYSIS
The analysis of the Court in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association 310
contained several fundamental flaws. First, the Court failed to account
for the important underlying, conflicting principles inherent in the regu-
lation of direct-mail solicitation. Second, the Court made an awkward
analytical jump from its reasoning in prior commercial speech cases to
that in Shapero. Finally, the Shapero majority and dissent failed to prop-
erly apply the four-part test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.31' This section exam-
ines these fundamental flaws. In addition, this section explains that
under the circumstances of Shapero the so called "prophylactic ban" on
all direct-target mail advertising/solicitation would not have been upheld
under the Central Hudson test for commercial speech. Therefore, while
the result reached in Shapero was correct, the Court failed to apply the
proper analysis. By failing to properly analyze the regulation at issue,
the Court has left it unclear as to how states are to devise attorney adver-
tising regulations that will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
A. Conflicting Principles Inherent in Regulating Attorney Advertising
1. Ethical considerations of attorney advertising
The Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association 32 Court failed to identify
and focus on the ethical obligations that a lawyer owes to society.31 3
Ethical and disciplinary rules for attorneys were first established on a
national level at the beginning of this century. 314 The purpose of these
regulations was to guide the ethical lawyer and establish uniform discipli-
nary rules to punish the unethical attorney.315 The Modern Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, promulgated by the American Bar Association
(ABA), broadly states the purpose behind these rules:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society de-
309. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370-72
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
310. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
311. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
312. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
313. The ethical obligations are presently stated in the ABA MODEL RULES, supra note
153. See infra notes 317-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ethical obligations
an attorney has when engaging in advertising and solicitation.
314. ABA CANON OF PROFESSIONAL ETmics Canon 27 (1908), reprinted in 33 A.B.A.
REP. 566, 582 (1908); see also H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 123-25 (1954).
315. ABA CANON, supra note 314.
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pends upon recognition of the "concept that justice is based
upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the
individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-
government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only
through such law does the dignity of the individual attain re-
spect and protection. . . . Lawyers, as guardians of the law,
play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment
of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their rela-
tionship with and function in our legal system. A consequent
obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of
ethical conduct.316
The rules against advertising evolved from the English system, were
rooted in basic professional courtesy and obligations to the client,3 17 and
were formulated primarily to eliminate the practices of common-law
maintenance, champerty and barratry.318 The fear that the attorney
would place his or her pecuniary interest above that of the client was a
primary motivating force which prompted the enactment of rules prohib-
iting these practices. The rules today require that the lawyer's obligation
to his or her own client be placed before all other interests.319 The prob-
lem is obvious: An ethical attorney is restrained from advertising be-
cause he or she may run the risk of abusing the ethical rules designed to
subordinate his or her pecuniary interests to the interests of the client.32 °
Prior to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,32' where the Supreme Court
held absolute bans on attorney advertising are unconstitutional, many
states followed the ABA disciplinary rules prohibiting advertising.322
316. MODEL CODE, supra note 154, preamble.
317. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 496 (1985).
318. In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963)). Maintenance is the practice of helping another set up a lawsuit. Champerty is en-
couraging or soliciting another to bring a lawsuit for a specific action. Barratry is the ongoing
practice of champerty and/or maintenance; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*134-36); Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966, 969-70
(1967) for a discussion of the origin of the common-law ethical rules.
319. MODEL CODE, supra note 154, DR 5-105; MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 1.7
comment 5.
320. MODEL RuLE, supra note 153, Rule 1.7. An attorney is obliged to subordinate all
interests adverse or potentially adverse to his or her own client's cause. Id. It follows that an
attorney's own pecuniary interest must be properly placed beneath the client's concern. Id. at
comment 6 ("The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on
representation of a client.... If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in
serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached
advice."); see also, MODEL CODE, supra note 154, DR 5-105(C).
321. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
322. See Hazard, supra note 304, at 1084 n.2, for a discussion of the nationwide attorney
advertising ban that preceded the Bates decision.
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After Bates, state rules and the ABA model disciplinary code slowly
changed to reflect the decision.323 The rules did not abolish all advertis-
ing restrictions and generally permitted advertising limited to the spirit
of Bates.324 After Bates, there are no general roadblocks to an attorney
actually advertising his or her services in a truthful, nonmisleading, legal
manner. 31 While certain forms of advertising may be regulated, an at-
torney has ample avenues to convey his or her message to the public.
3 26
For example, an attorney may advertise in the newspaper, 27 on radio
and television,328 in the telephone directory,329 through mass general
mailings, 330 or by placing his or her name with nonprofit lawyer referral
services.331
The new rules, however, continued to prohibit the practice of solicit-
ing clients and accepting employment after providing unsolicited advice
to a non-client.332 Soliciting clients includes in-person contact similar to
the complained conduct in Chralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,3 3 and
the practice of direct-mail solicitation, such as in Shapero.334 A com-
ment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explains the rationale
behind the ban on solicitation:
The situation is... fraught with the possibility of undue influ-
ence, intimidation, and over-reaching. This potential for abuse
inherent in direct solicitation of prospective clients justifies its
prohibition, particularly since lawyer advertising permitted
under Rule 7.2 offers an alternative means of communicating
necessary information to those who may be in need of legal
services.335
The first ethical consideration behind regulations restricting advertising
323. MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 7.2(a). Rule 7.2(a) states that: "Subject to the
requirements of rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a
telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor, radio or televi-
sion, or through written communication not involving solicitation as defined in rule 7.3." Id.
324. Id.
325. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
326. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.31 at 147.
327. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
328. MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 7.2(a). See supra text accompanying note 323,
for text of Rule 7.2(a).
329. In Re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 196, 206-07 (1982).
330. Id. at 206.
331. MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 7.2(a).
332. Id. Rule 7.3.
333. 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978).
334. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919.
335. MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 7.3 comment 2.
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and solicitations concerns the need to prevent attorneys from subordinat-
ing the interests of potential clients' to their own.
The second ethical concern of the organized bar is reflected in the
rule prohibiting the practice of accepting employment after offering unre-
quested advice.336 Both the rule against direct in-person solicitation and
the rule against offering unsolicitated advice to non-clients and then ac-
cepting employment reflect the traditional prohibition of practicing bar-
ratry.33 They also reflect the concern that the layperson be protected
from attorneys who are willing to sacrifice a client's interest for their own
pecuniary gain.33 As Bates and its progeny have pushed back the
boundary line for permissible restrictions on advertising and solicitation,
lawyers motivated by their own pecuniary interests have moved in to fill
the void.339 Public dislike for attorneys who abuse the system clearly
indicates some regulations are necessary to assure continued respect for
the profession.3" Thus, regulations are needed to ensure that attorneys
do not subordinate the interests of their clients.
2. The public's interests in receiving attorney advertising
While the ethical considerations and disciplinary rules regulate the
profession, the public's interests in being informed about attorney serv-
ices are of primary importance. There must be a marketplace for ideas in
order for the public to become knowledgeable about general legal serv-
ices.341 Without advertising, it is possible that a large percentage of the
population would be unaware of specific attorney services, costs and
availability.342 Generally, dissemination of information is valuable and
important to the consumer, and represents the primary conceptual road-
block to enacting regulations on attorney advertising.343
336. Id. Rule 1.7.
337. See supra text accompanying note 318 for a definition of barratry.
338. One point of view holds that the reason behind advertising is purely economic, and
that the pecuniary interest of the attorney advances advertising. See Hazard, supra note 304.
339. See e.g., In Re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985) (attorney solicited victims of mass disaster by sending di-
rect-mail advertisement claiming appointment as special counsel for victims and families).
340. See Cox, A Low Key Meeting for California Bar, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 10, 1988, at 3, col. 1;
Scott, Attorneys Want To Polish Image, United Press Int'l, July 25, 1988, (morning ed.).
341. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376.
342. Id. at 373-74; see also Hazard, supra note 304, at 1084.
343. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646:
Our recent decisions involving commercial speech have been grounded in the faith
that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing
on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the
helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful. The value of the
information presented in appellant's advertising is no less than that contained in
other forms of advertising ....
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While attorney advertising and solicitation serve to enlighten the
public, there also exist concerns that the public may become subjected to
invasions of privacy, overreaching, and misleading practices by the ad-
vertising or soliciting attorney.3" In Ohralik, the privacy issue involved
an attorney who visited potential clients at the hospital and at home
while recuperating.34 Privacy may be invaded in a number of ways, and
different persons may require differing degrees of privacy protection.346
The Shapero Court stated that privacy concerns arise only in situations
where the potential client is confronted with direct in-person
solicitation.347
Privacy, however, is not limited to situations where a lawyer, his
representative, or a direct-target solicitation letter shows up on an indi-
vidual's doorstep. Even the Shapero majority conceded that an invasion
of privacy may occur when the soliciting lawyer or his representative
seeks out public or private information concerning an individual's per-
sonal or professional legal troubles in anticipation of procuring the per-
son as a client.34g For example, suppose a motorist arrested for driving
while intoxicated receives a letter the next day from an attorney offering
representation. Unaware the arrest report has been released to the attor-
ney, the motorist is made to feel additional, unnecessary humiliation
upon finding OUt. 34 9 While certain matters may be contained in public
records, other possible claims and actions may be discoverable with mini-
mal efforts to industrious lawyers.350 If attorneys can solicit in this man-
ner, they are encouraged to invade a person's privacy. By regulating
attorney solicitation, the ability or incentive to invade a potential client's
Id.
344. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
345. Id. at 450-51.
346. See generally R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.36, for a discussion of the varying
privacy concerns present in constitutional law.
347. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922-23. The Court treated privacy interests in a targeted mail-
ing as equal to a general mailing, and stated: "Nor does a targeted letter invade the recipient's
privacy more than does a substantively identical letter mailed at large." Id. at 1923.
348. Id.
349. See Wall St. J., July 5, 1988, § 2 at 21, cols. 3-6. Within 72 hours after being arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol, one individual received five letters from lawyers who
were "eager" to represent him. Id. A lawyer in Washington, D.C. combs police files weekly
and sends out letters to potential clients charged with serious traffic offenses. Id. In four years
this attorney has been retained by over 2000 clients who were contacted in this manner. Id.
350. Id. Some unethical attorneys pay fees to ambulance drivers, tow truck operators,
emergency room employees and city and state governmental employees for names and ad-
dresses of persons with legal problems. This practice of "capping" is generally forbidden and
is considered criminal activity in some jurisdictions. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6152-
6153 (West 1974 & West Supp. 1989).
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privacy will be reduced if not removed. 5 1
Another public concern is preventing attorneys from overreaching
or misleading a layperson or exploiting his or her lack of knowledge. 2
The primary argument discounting the presence of these problems in di-
rect-mail solicitation is that the reader can "'effectively avoid further
bombardment of [his or her] sensibilities simply by averting [his or her]
eyes.' " However, there are four flaws in this argument. First, the
recipient is likely to be entrenched in a real legal problem when he or she
receives the letter.35 4  Justice O'Connor has noted that the emotional
stress of a particular situation can "overpower the will and judgment of
laypeople who have not sought" the advice of counsel.355 The position of
influence an attorney holds in modem society builds into the letter au-
thority and prestige, making it more difficult to "put [the letter] in a
drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded.
'" 356
Second, the letter itself is likely to convince a layperson that the
attorney has some superior and particular knowledge concerning that in-
dividual's personal legal problem. 7 Absent some type of insider infor-
351. The proposal section of this Note discusses various regulations, which, if implemented,
would address the privacy concerns by regulating the practice. Anytime an individual is spe-
cifically selected because of potential legal problems, privacy concerns are triggered. By regu-
lating the practice, the potential client is more likely to be protected from unwarranted
invasions. See infra notes 463-502 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion.
352. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1925-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 1922-23 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
354. See Leoni v. State Bar of Cal., 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985),
summarily dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (attorneys sent out many letters to defendants in
pending lawsuits offering advice concerning bankruptcy); see also In Re Von Weigen, 481
N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985)
(attorney obtained list of victims of Kansas City hotel collapse disaster; letters written offering
advice and representation claimed attorney was appointed by fictitious committee).
355. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment, and dissenting in part).
356. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923. The majority did not believe a direct-mail letter was
inherently overpowering or misleading, but believed the recipient could put the letter in a
drawer and discard it. Id. The dissent in Shapero, however, disagreed with the majority:
For people whose formal contacts with the legal system are infrequent, the authority
of the law itself may tend to cling to attorneys just as it does to police officers. Unso-
phisticated citizens, understandably intimidated by the courts and its officers, may
therefore find it much more difficult to ignore an apparently "personalized" letter
from an attorney than to ignore a general advertisement.
Id. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
357. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Consider the letter in Shapero, which indicated that
Shapero knew the recipients were in the middle of a foreclosure action and offered to help
prevent the recipient from losing his or her home. Id. at 1919. Near the conclusion of the
letter, Shapero simply stated, "It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you." Id.
With the combination of knowledge and an apparent promise, a recipient could find it more
difficult to ignore this "personalized" correspondence. Id. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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mation, it is highly unlikely an attorney would have special knowledge
concerning that person's specific legal problem.358 The letter, however,
creates an inference that the attorney is specially knowledgeable and able
to offer assistance because he or she knows about the problem.
359
Third, the layperson is not likely to report the attorney to discipli-
nary authorities if he or she claims to be able to assist in their problems.
The attorney's conduct becomes "not visible or otherwise open to public
scrutiny. ' ' 31 The Shapero majority suggested subsequent review and
post-facto policing for reported and investigated complaints. 61 The
Court, however, failed to address situations where the attorney's letter
may have misled someone, caused someone to overreact or invaded per-
sonal or professional privacy, yet still succeeded in procuring the individ-
ual as a client. Successful representation would not relieve the attorney
from his ethical obligation, nor would it obviate disciplinary charges.362
Finally, the lawyer who sends a letter may offer advice serving the law-
yer's own pecuniary interests rather than containing advice specifically
addressing the client's needs, desires or goals.3 63 An attorney may abuse
the privity of such a communication by encouraging litigation and other
lawyer involvement, rather than suggesting non-litigation remedies
which may better serve the client's interests.
364
3. Regulating direct-mail solicitation serves to advance
the underlying principles
In reality, an absolute ban on direct-target mail solicitation evolved
as a "manner" restriction affecting the form of an attorney's advertise-
358. See MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 1.1, which reads: "A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Mere
knowledge of a recipient's particular legal problem does not make an attorney competent to
handle a legal case. In an accompanying comment, the circumstances are more fully defined:
[R]elevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the mat-
ter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field
in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of
established competence in the field in question.
Id. comment 1.
359. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
360. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
361. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924.
362. The Model Rules do not excuse the attorneys from their ethical obligations merely
because of successful representation. MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 7.3 comment 5.
363. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
364. See supra notes 314-34 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning the attor-
ney's pecuniary gain.
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ment. 65 As discussed above,366 many forms of advertising are now open
to attorneys. The regulation struck down in Shapero prevented only one
manner of advertising: direct-target mail solicitation. 367 The lawyer's
message to prospective clients could indeed reach his or her audience
through other available avenues.
3 61
This section of the analysis has discussed four general principles that
constitute the concerns underlying regulating direct-mail solicitation.
They are: (1) an ethical attorney has an obligation to not overreach or
mislead when soliciting or advertising for specific cases from non-cli-
ents; 69 (2) the public is vulnerable to those attorneys willing to place
their own pecuniary gain before the client's specific legal problem;37 ° (3)
the privacy of an individual with a specific legal problem may be invaded
when the attorney ferrets out this problem and again when he or she
sends a solicitation letter to the individual;371 and (4) the attorney's first
amendment rights are not unduly infringed upon because other forms of
advertising remain available.372 All are properly served by regulating
and controlling direct-target mail solicitation.373
B. Criticism of the Court's Reasoning
1. Misplaced reliance on prior attorney advertising decisions
This section of the analysis discusses a misplaced reliance on earlier
attorney advertising decisions by the majority in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association.374 The Shapero Court, however, failed to focus properly on
365. Time, place or manner regulations do not attempt to control or regulate the actual
content of the underlying speech, but only the time, place or manner in which the speech is
presented. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). A regulation
that facially regulates only the time, place or manner may, nevertheless, unwittingly control
content. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 367 (1972). If content is actually regulated,
the restriction is likely to be struck down. See supra note 61 for a brief discussion of time,
place and manner versus content based regulations of different types of speech.
366. See supra notes 326-31 and accompanying text.
367. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
7.3 (1983)).
368. Id. at 1928 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested some advertising would
still be constitutionally protected under more rigorous standards, allowing the dissemination of
legal information. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
369. See MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 7.3.
370. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 326-31 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 312-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ethical consider-
ations, the public concerns and the underlying interests involved, which are properly served by
regulating direct-target mail solicitation.
374. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
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the similarities and differences between In Re Primus37 and the facts of
Shapero. Primus involved an attorney who, while working with the
ACLU, contacted a woman by mail about a possible lawsuit.3 76 The dis-
ciplinary charges against the attorney were dismissed because first
amendment associational freedom protections were triggered.3 Attor-
ney Primus' direct-target letter was specifically protected because it in-
volved underlying constitutionally protected associational activities.378
The Primus Court could have ignored the associational issue and upheld
the direct-target letter because it was a "truthful and nondeceptive law-
yer solicitation. 3 79  Instead, the Primus Court enunciated legitimate
state concerns beyond mere truth in advertising:
The State is free to fashion reasonable restrictions with respect
to the time, place, and manner of solicitation by members of its
Bar. The State's special interest in regulating members of a
profession it licenses, and who serve as officers of its courts,
amply justifies the application of narrowly drawn rules to pro-
scribe solicitation that in fact is misleading, overbearing, or in-
volves other features of deception or improper influence. As we
decide today in Ohralik, a State may also forbid in-person solic-
itation for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result
in these evils.38 °
If the attorney in Primus had been acting for her own pecuniary interest
and not furthering a protected activity, the circumstances would have
been substantially similar to Shapero. If that had been the case, the re-
sult would not have been based upon an underlying constitutionally pro-
tected activity, but would have been subject to commercial regulation
much like the companion case of Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Association.3"'
The absolute ban on in-person advertising upheld by the Ohralik
375. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
376. Id. at 414-16.
377. Id. at 439. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
378. Id. at 431. "[The letter] thus comes within the generous zone of [first amendment]
protection reserved for associational freedoms." Id.
379. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924.
380. Primus, 436 U.S. at 438-39 (citations and footnotes omitted).
381. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In his Primus dissent, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the dis-
tinction and would have found the letter subject to the same absolute ban upheld in Ohralik.
Id. at 445-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist characterized the Court's distinc-
tion turning not on form, but on the underlying conduct:
In this case and the companion case... the Court tells its own tale of two lawyers:
One tale ends happily for the lawyer and one does not. If we were given the latitude
of novelists in deciding between happy and unhappy endings for the heroes and vil-
lains of our tales, I might well join in the Court's disposition of both cases.
Id. at 440 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court is one example of a modem day commercial speech ban. The
Court will not hesitate to permit limitations on commercial speech that it
deems particularly worthy of regulation.382 However, the Shapero
Court's decision to reject the ban on direct-target mail solicitation cannot
be traced to either Primus or Ohralik. The Primus ban was overruled on
grounds of associational freedoms.383 In Shapero, a protected activity
such as freedom of association was not at issue.384 The Ohralik ban was
permitted because direct in-person solicitation was involved.38 In Sha-
pero, the attorney was not soliciting cases in person, but through the
mails.386 Therefore, the door remained open for states to regulate lawyer
direct-mail solicitations to protect the public from false, misleading and
overreaching information.387
The Shapero Court expressly chose to limit Ohralik to its facts-in-
person solicitations.388 The Shapero Court could have read Chralik as
imposing a manner restriction, but instead interpreted Ohralik as con-
cerning the attorney's specific conduct. 389  This misses the mark.
Ohralik was significant not because it involved a single attorney's repre-
hensible conduct, but because an entire category of direct-client contact
was banned. 390 A more narrowly tailored regulation could not have fur-
thered the state's regulatory goals.391
Furthermore, the Ohralik holding was never intended to be limited
382. Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 344
(1986).
383. Primus, 436 U.S. at 431, 438-39.
384. The issue in Shapero was framed by the Court as presenting a question of "whether a
State may ... categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain
by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients." Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919.
385. Chralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
386. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919.
387. See R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.31 at 150 (Court's prior decisions indicate states
may regulate lawyer solicitation in order to protect public).
388. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922-23 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
457-58, 464-66 & n.25 (1978)).
389. Id. Justice Marshall stated that "the Court's actual holding in Ohralik is a limited
one: that the solicitation of business, under circumstances-such as those found in this rec-
ord-presenting substantial dangers of harm to society or the client independent of the solici-
tation itself, may constitutionally be prohibited by the State." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 470
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
390. Chralik, 436 U.S. at 468.
391. Id. at 466-67. Ohralik did involve an attorney visiting the client at home, but the
Court went on to indicate that prophylactic regulations were not limited to direct in-person
solicitation, but where [the states] demonstrate the need for prophylactic regulation in further-
ance of the State's interest in protecting the lay public." Id. at 468. Therefore, "a solicitation
in circumstances like those of this case" would warrant regulation even in the form of an
absolute ban. Id. at 466.
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to exclusively in-person solicitations.392 The Chralik Court suggested
that other areas of attorney advertising could be subject to regulations
depending on the differing degree of concerns involved.393 By failing to
address Chralik properly, the Shapero Court minimized the importance
to states of regulating attorney advertising conduct.
The Shapero Court also improperly relied on In Re R. M J.394 In
R. M. J., the Court concluded that certain mail solicitations are pro-
tected forms of advertising. 395 However, R. M. J. was limited to a situa-
tion involving general mass mailings to unknown, randomly selected
individuals.3 96 Shapero, on the other hand, involved direct-target mail
where the attorney selects specific persons who are in need of specific
legal services-a different manner of advertising than R. M. J. which
warrants special scrutiny. 397 Even the R. M. J. decision permitted con-
siderable latitude for states to regulate an advertisement if it is "poten-
tially or demonstrably misleading.
393
More importantly, the primary flaw in Shapero was the Court's mis-
placed reliance upon Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 39 9 The
Court devoted the majority of its opinion to drawing connections be-
tween Shapero and Zauderer. The Zauderer decision permitted an attor-
ney to place newspaper advertisements offering representation for a
specific legal case.4 0 The Shapero Court cites to Zauderer through out
its opinion to distinguish and isolate all written advertisements from in-
person solicitation. 4 1 One particular passage in Zauderer formed the
basis for the Shapero Court's reliance:
More significantly, appellant's advertising-and print advertis-
ing generally-poses much less risk of overreaching or undue
392. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the
majority's transmutations and limitations of Chralik were derived from dicta contained in
Zauderer. Id.
393. The Ohralik Court was non-specific in identifying areas for attorney regulations.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67. The state regulating agency has always been held to have a strong
interest in regulating attorney advertising. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-84
(1977). States were still free to regulate following Ohralik. See Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650-53 (1985); In Re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982).
394. 444 U.S. 191 (1982).
395. Id. at 206.
396. Id.
397. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
398. R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 202; see also Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1928 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
399. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
400. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647 (victims of allegedly defective Dalkon Shield advised to
contact attorney for representation).
401. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920-24.
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influence [than in-person solicitations]. Print advertising may
convey information and ideas more or less effectively, but in
most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the personal pres-
ence of a trained advocate. In addition, a printed advertise-
ment, unlike a personal encounter initiated by an attorney, is
not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an im-
mediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation." 2
Zauderer could have been limited to its specific facts-it is unconstitu-
tional to ban newspaper advertising offering legal advice to similarly situ-
ated potential plaintiffs and then subsequently representing them.4"3
However, the Shapero Court's analysis of the opinion expanded Zauderer
to include all written forms of attorney advertising.' It concluded that
since Zauderer could have sent a mass mailer rather than advertise in a
newspaper, a direct-target solicitation is entitled to the same level of first
amendment protection as any other printed advertisement."°S It is here
that the logic fails. °6
Zauderer did not expand first amendment protection into any new
medium of advertising, as the Shapero opinion implies. °' Rather,
Zauderer built upon R. M. J by adding to the types of content that the
first amendment protects in a certain media, newspaper advertising."°
The Zauderer result is not surprising considering that content-based re-
strictions are most disfavored and, predictably, subject to close
scrutiny."4
9
The Shapero letter should also have been subject to a higher degree
of scrutiny than the newspaper advertisements in Zauderer because it
402. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
403. Id. at 656.
404. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921-22. But see R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.31 at 149;
Note: The Liberalization of Attorney Commercial Speech Rights, 21 WAKE FOREsr L. REv.
1019 (1986). These authors limited their discussion of the Zauderer Court decision to the
disclosure requirements and the expanded ability of lawyers to advertise for specific cases or
clients.
405. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921.
406. See supra notes 312-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems in-
volved with target advertising.
407. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 639. The Bates Court, prior to Zauderer, approved an attor-
ney's advertisement. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. The newspaper advertisement addressed a spe-
cific legal case, and the attorney accepted employment resulting from legal advice placed in the
newspaper advertisement. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 639. While newspaper advertisement was
previously permitted in Ohio, the practice of accepting employment resulting from truthful
and non-deceptive yet unsolicited legal advice was not protected until the Zauderer decision.
Id. at 626.
408. R. M. J, 455 U.S. at 207.
409. See R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.47 at 235-62, for a general discussion of the
differences and distinctions between content and time, place or manner restrictions.
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arguably implied particular knowledge of the potential client's situa-
tion. 10 The Zauderer Court did not rely upon prior attorney advertising
decisions to reach its conclusion that "[a]n attorney may not be disci-
plined for soliciting legal business through printed advertising containing
truthful and nondeceptive information and advice regarding the legal
rights of potential clients." '411
The Shapero Court illogically jumped from the Zauderer newspaper
advertisement to the Shapero direct-target letters. In the process, the
Court expanded constitutional protection "around practices that have
even more potential for abuse."41 2 The Shapero Court failed to under-
take its own independent Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York 4"3 analysis, and simply utilized the
above quoted dicta from Zauderer.41 4 Significantly, the Zauderer Court
did not suggest that future attorney advertising decisions should dispense
with the critical Central Hudson speech analysis.4 15 The Zauderer Court
undertook to analyze, under Central Hudson, each subject advertisement
and regulation before rejecting the restrictions. 41 '6 The Shapero analysis,
however, lacked the comprehensive analysis perpetuated by Zauderer; it
merely paid it lip service.417 By failing to use the proper analysis, the
importance of the Central Hudson test in future attorney advertising
cases appears diminished.
2. Failure to apply the Central Hudson test
In 1980, the Court established a four-part test to determine if a regu-
lation unconstitutionally infringed upon commercial speech.418 Simply
410. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
411. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647. The Zauderer Court based its decision on the four-part
Central Hudson test. Id. at 638, 647, 651-52 & n.14 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). While the Zauderer opinion
did discuss the other attorney advertising cases, its focus was on the application of the test. Id.
412. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
413. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See supra notes 120-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the four-part Central Hudson test.
414. Id. at 1921-24 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641-42,
646 (1985)). Central Hudson was briefly mentioned, yet the Court relied on Zauderer to reach
its decision to prohibit the absolute ban. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 641-42, 646 (1985)).
415. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
416. Id. at 639-47. See supra notes 188-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
the Central Hudson four-part test was applied to each regulation that the attorney allegedly
violated in Zauderer.
417. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
418. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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stated, the test involves comparing commercial speech that is not mis-
leading or untruthful and concerns a lawful activity with the state's regu-
lation; if the regulation advances a "substantial state interest" it will be
upheld unless there are less restrictive means for successfully achieving
the same goal.419 A primary flaw in the Shapero Court's analysis was its
failure to apply the Central Hudson test properly. The Central Hudson
test provides a tested and principled rationale to validate the regulation
banning Shapero's direct-target letter. Applying the test against the
background of the important state interests42 discussed above gives the
states considerable latitude in future regulation of direct-target mail
solicitation.421
a. misleading, false or illegal advertising
In the majority opinion, the Central Hudson test is briefly men-
tioned, but not applied to the facts.422 The Shapero Court correctly clas-
sified the speech as commercial, rather than political, because the
attorney's own pecuniary interests were present.423 In addition, the
speech involved was not per se misleading or untruthful nor did it involve
illegal activity.424 Therefore, the first amendment affords it some level of
419. Id. The first amendment does not protect speech that is misleading, untruthful or
concerns an illegal or unlawful activity. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
420. The important concerns involve the ethical professional obligation of an attorney not
to subordinate the client's interests for his or her own pecuniary gain, preventing deceptive
practices injurious to the public, protecting the privacy rights of the general public, and pro-
viding a forum for attorneys to advertise. See supra notes 312-73 and accompanying text.
421. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1928 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
422. Id. at 1921. The Court stated:
"Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful
activity... may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental inter-
est, and only through means that directly advance that interest." ... Since state
regulations of commercial speech "may extend only as far as the interest it serves,"
Central Hudson ... state[d] rules that are... designed to prevent the "potential for
deception and confusion... may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent
the" perceived evil.
Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) and In Re R.
M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). However, the Central Hudson test should provide the analy-
sis for modem commercial speech cases. It synthesizes the historical evolution of the commer-
cial speech doctrine to determine whether the governmental regulation should fail. See R.
ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.31 at 161-62; Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (Central Hudson test applied to validate advertising ban
on Puerto Rico casinos); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (federal
statute prohibiting mailing advertisements for contraceptives violates first amendment under
four-part test).
423. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921.
424. Id. at 1920. This is the threshold question of the Central Hudson test, since misleading
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protection.42 Accepting the advertisement at least as facially not mis-
leading, false or illegal, the question becomes whether there is a substan-
tial state interest in regulating attorney advertising and whether the
regulation was drawn narrowly to do no more than advance that state
interest.426
b. substantial state interest in regulating attorney advertising
The Court failed to identify a substantial state interest, and conse-
quently failed to apply the Central Hudson test properly.427 The Court
previously had noted that "the interest of the State in regulating lawyers
is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmen-
tal function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers
of the courts.' "428 The substantial state interest breaks down into two
major categories: (1) the prevention of deception, involving practices of
overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercising of undue influence de-
ception and even fraud429 and (2) interests of maintaining and promoting
professionalism through ethical standards.4 30 However, the demand for
professionalism alone does not qualify as a substantial state interest in
regulating commercial speech.43 ' Therefore, ethical and professional
rules and regulations are promulgated by organized bar associations to
advance the legal system's demand for professionalism and, more impor-
tantly, to protect clients and the public at large.4 32
or false advertising or advertising of an illegal activity warrants no constitutional protection.
Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
425. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1928 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But note, however, that the
dissent would identify all attorney advertising as misleading because even truthful advertising
fails to promote the ethical standards necessary in the legal profession. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In fact, however, certain types of advertising advance both the interests of attor-
neys and of the general public. The advertisement acts to inform the public of available stan-
dardized legal services while allowing the attorney to expand his or her practice. Bates, 433
U.S. at 368-70. In some instances, the advertisement may inform the public of a specific claim,
and permit the attorney to specialize while exercising first amendment communication free-
doms. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 630-31.
426. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641.
427. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1928-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
428. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (quoting Sperry v. Florida ex
rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963)).
429. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-
65 (1978)).
430. See Chralik, 436 U.S. at 461. But see Bates, 433 U.S. at 371-72 (Bates Court did not
believe professionalism argument alone sufficient to justify banning attorney advertising alto-
gether). See also supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bates Court
decision.
431. See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
432. See, eg., MODEL RULES, supra note 153, preamble; MODEL CODE, supra note 154,
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The interests in preventing deceptive practices and upholding the
attorney's ethical obligations both serve to protect the public from uneth-
ical attorneys.433 Preventing deceptive or misleading practices is proba-
bly the most significant state interest. The position attorneys occupy in
society requires that rules be designed to prevent advertising that is "mis-
leading, overbearing or involves other features of deception or improper
influence." '434 In R. M. J., the Court found that preventing deceptive
practices by attorneys is a legitimate state interest and would have up-
held narrowly drawn regulations.43 In the cases before and after Central
Hudson, the Court found a substantial interest in the need to protect the
public from attorneys who engage in "deceptive" practices. 36 In Sha-
pero, a substantial state interest was present because a lawyer was in-
volved in an activity that might lead to potentially deceptive practices.437
c. the ban directly advances the state's substantial interest
The third factor in the Central Hudson test requires determining
whether the state regulation directly advances the identified substantial
state interest.438 A total ban on advertising would serve to protect the
public from deceptive attorney practices. In Bates, the Court charged
regulatory agencies and organizations with the responsibility of assuring
that only nondeceptive advertising reaches the public. 43 9 In Ohralik, the
prophylactic ban served to advance a state interest in prohibiting over-
reaching attorneys from engaging in deceptive practices." 0 Under cir-
cumstances similar to the facts in Ohralik, a total ban will further the
state's interest in regulating attorney advertising." 1 For example, where
preamble and preliminary statement; see also CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
2-101 (West 1981).
433. Chralik, 436 U.S. at 461. While prohibiting deceptive practices protects the public, the
underlying rationale for the "ethical standards of lawyers are linked to the service and protec-
tion of clients." Id. The theory is that the ethical standards "further the goals of 'true profes-
sionalism."' Id. (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977)).
434. Primus, 436 U.S. at 438.
435. R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 207.
436. See Chralik, 436 U.S. at 462 for a case that found "a legitimate and important state
interest" in preventing fraud, undue influence, deception, and misleading practices by attor-
neys. Id.
437. See Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919. The letter might have misled a recipient into believing
that the attorney could resolve all the recipient's legal problems involving the foreclosure. Id.
438. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
439. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. "[W]e recognize that many of the problems in defining the
boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved, and we ex-
pect that the bar will have a special role to play in assuring the advertising by attorneys flows
both freely and cleanly." Id.
440. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
441. Id. at 466-67. While there can be little doubt that a total ban does succeed in advanc-
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the deceptive practices cannot be regulated in other effective manners, a
ban may provide the only effective manner of regulating. 42 However,
this part of the test concerns not whether the regulation is the only effec-
tive method of advancing a substantial state interest; rather this part fo-
cuses on whether the "regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted."" 3
The Shapero analysis missed the point behind the third step of the
test; the point is not to establish the narrowly tailored relationship of the
regulations to the state's goal, but to show a direct link between the sub-
stantial state interest and the challenged regulation. 4 Prior Court deci-
sions easily identified this link and chose to focus on the fourth step,
showing whether the regulation was not more extensive than reasonably
necessary to advance the state's interest." The facts of Shapero demon-
strate that a prophylactic ban on attorney direct-target mail advertising
directly advances a substantial state interest: Banning direct-target mail
solicitation certainly directly advances the state's interest in protecting
the public from potentially deceptive, misleading, false or illegal advertis-
ing. Thus, if the Shapero Court had properly applied Central Hudson,
the state regulation would have met the third requirement of the test.
d. the challenged regulation is more extensive than is necessary
The fourth and final step in the Central Hudson test requires a
searching analysis of the state's regulation to determine if it is more ex-
tensive than necessary to advance the substantial state interest." 6 The
Shapero Court, however, never reached a logical conclusion because the
ing the substantial state interests involved, the regulations discussed in the proposal section of
this Note also serve to advance the state interest in a less burdensome manner. See supra notes
463-502 and accompanying text.
442. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67.
443. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Indeed, if "identification of a government interest
directly advanced" meant "identification of the only permissive method of advancement," the
final step of the four-part test-"whether [the regulation] is not more extensive than neces-
sary" would not be required, and Central Hudson would become a three-part test.
444. Id. at 557. In Central Hudson, the Court found the link because:
[Tihe State interest in energy conservation is directly advanced by the Commission
order at issue here. There is an immediate connection between advertising and de-
mand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it
believed that promotion would increase its sales. Thus, we find a direct link between
the state interest in conservation and the Commission's order.
Id.
445. R. M. ., 455 U.S. at 207. The focus was on the means taken in advancing the regula-
tion, and not the regulation itself, see also Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343 (ban on casino advertising
directly advanced state's substantial interests).
446. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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majority mistakenly focused on the factual similarities with Zauderer.47
The Court revealed its misapplication of the Central Hudson rationale:
But merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents
lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does
not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial
speech.... The State can regulate such abuses and minimize
mistakes through far less restrictive and more precise means,
the most obvious of which is to require the lawyer to file any
solicitation letter with a state agency." 8
The issue is not whether the inspection regulations merely protect the
public, but whether the regulations are sufficient to achieve the state in-
terest described above. An absolute ban on direct-target mail solicitation
may "sweep no more broadly than is necessary to advance a substantial
governmental interest." 449 The problem with the post-publication regu-
lations suggested by the Shapero Court is that if they are ineffective the
damage may have already been done.450
The Court has indicated that the presence of a failed less restrictive
path may prove helpful in determining if a regulation is sufficiently nar-
rowly drawn.45 1 The majority in Shapero suggested a series of narrowly
447. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922-23 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 642 (1985)). See supra notes 399-416 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
Zauderer was misinterpreted by the Shapero Court.
448. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923 (citing In Re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203, 206 (1982)).
Regulatory options are discussed in the proposal sections of this Note. See infra notes 463-
502. They are especially important following the Shapero Court's rejection of an absolute ban
as a permissible option. Local and state bar associations should consider different available
regulatory options. However, post-publication regulations do little to obviate some of the con-
cerns that gave rise to the substantial state interests; namely, protecting the public from inher-
ently deceptive practices and promoting ethical and principled standards of the practicing bar.
See infra notes 463-502 and accompanying text for a proposal on permissible regulations of
direct-target mail attorney solicitations.
449. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1928 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent would have recon-
sidered and presumably overruled Bates utilizing the Central Hudson test. Id. at 1929
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Attorney advertising, in general, does serve many of the important
functions set out by the Court in Bates. One important area includes providing a resource to
which the public may turn to locate legal services. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72.
450. See text accompanying infra note 451 for specific examples of how direct, unregulated
solicitation of clients through the mail fails to protect the public.
451. R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 206. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the R. M. J. "sub-test," which the regulating agency may utilize to establish that a less
restrictive path was initiated yet failed to advance the substantial state interest.
In those states that prior to Shapero had no restrictions on direct-mail solicitation, the
record reveals embarrassing lawyer ethical violations. See Leoni v. State Bar of Cal., 39 Cal.
3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985), summarily dismissed, 455 U.S. 1001 (1986).
In Leoni, attorneys Slate and Leoni operated a large Los Angeles bankruptcy practice repre-
senting debtors where they obtained lists of defendants in pending civil small claims, municipal
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tailored options, including: Requiring the lawyer to bear the burden of
producing copies of letters at disciplinary proceedings; the letter stating
how facts were discovered and "bear[ing] a label identifying it as an ad-
vertisement ... or directing the recipient how to report inaccurate or
misleading letters. '452 The post-publication regulations suggested by the
majority may provide sufficient protection from deceptive, misleading or
overreaching attorneys but do little to protect the privacy interests of
individuals or further the ethical obligations of the legal profession.
However, other effective post-publication regulations can prevent decep-
tive practices, protect the public's privacy interests and uphold ethical
profession-wide standards.4 3 Thus, the privacy interests of the public4" 4
are best protected through an absolute ban, but other means of regulating
and superior court cases. Over the course of twenty months, the attorneys sent out over
250,000 letters; these letters outlined bankruptcy as an available option to these defendants for
debt relief, perhaps even for relief from the pending actions. Id. at 615-16, 704 P.2d at 186-87,
217 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27. Many recipients were unaware of the status of the lawsuits, filed
simply to protect against the statute of limitation and in some situations informational letters
mailed to individual's homes and office acted to advise employers and families of legal
problems defendants were attempting to resolve quietly; Id. at 618-21, 704 P.2d at 188-90, 217
Cal. Rptr. 428-30; In Re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985). In Von Wiegen, an attorney directed his secretary
to send letters to victims and families of victims of the Kansas City Hyatt hotel disaster; the
letters indicated that the secretary was the chair of a special committee established to assist the
accident victims. Id. at 178-79, 470 N.E.2d at 846-47, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 48-49. The committee
had supposedly appointed attorney Von Wiegen as special counsel. The letter went on to state
that Von Wiegen was also more than happy to represent victims in their own lawsuits. Id.; see
also Adams v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986)
(group of bankruptcy attorneys utilized direct-target mail solicitation, sued state committee for
injunctive relief allowing them to continue the practice of mail advertising solicitation); Greene
v. Grievance Comm., 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981) (attorneys
disciplined for sending solicitation letters to real estate brokers).
For cases following the Shapero decision see Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856
F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1988) (attorney utilized drawings and characters, classified by state as undig-
nified, in direct-target mail solicitation); Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois Inc., No. 83
Civ. 512 (N.D. IMI. Aug. 16, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 87038) (attorneys involved in class action
litigation representing plaintiffs sent letters to other potential class action plaintiffs); Paris v.
Lake Carroll Holding Inc., No. 87 Civ. 8502 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW
74672) (attorneys sent letters to lot owners who may have had claims, warning them to investi-
gate land and potential health claims; and lawyer willing to represent for fee).
452. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924. The Shapero Court did not indicate whether the proposed
regulations would advance the substantial state interest. Id.
453. See supra text accompanying note 451. New York and California are two states where
the advertising ban had been lifted prior to Shapero. In those states, little or no post-regula-
tions and restrictions have not succeeded in controlling or preventing abuses. Id. In Califor-
nia and New York, the state high courts effectively lifted any advertising ban on direct-mail
solicitation in their respective opinions. Leoni, 39 Cal. 3d at 624, 704 P.2d at 192, 217 Cal.
Rptr. at 432; Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 170, 470 N.E.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
454. See supra notes 344-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of privacy concerns and
the rationale for protecting the privacy interest.
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direct-target mail advertising and protecting the privacy interests are
available. Direct-target mail letters are certainly subject to deceptive
practices because they are not subject to any public scrutiny and inher-
ently exercise substantial influence over laypersons. 4 5  However, they
may be regulated in a manner less restrictive than an absolute ban.
Four underlying principles emerge as representative of the varying
interests involved in the regulation of attorney advertising and solicita-
tion: (1) the ethical obligations lawyers owe to the public and their pro-
fession; (2) the protection of the public from overreaching and deceptive
practices; (3) potential client's right of privacy; and (4) the commercial
free-speech rights of attorneys to disseminate information and the public
to receive this information." 6 The Central Hudson four-part test should
be applied against the backdrop of these principles when analyzing di-
rect-mail solicitation of clients.45 7 The state's substantial interest in regu-
lating potentially deceptive and overreaching practices can be effectively
achieved through an absolute ban on this type of solicitation. However,
an absolute ban is more restrictive than necessary to achieve the state
goal. The regulation banning direct-mail advertising in Shapero fails
under the "least restrictive" prong of the Central Hudson test because the
less restrictive regulations, such as those suggested by the Court,458 could
have been implemented.
In sum, the Shapero Court did not properly apply the Central Hud-
son test, yet reached the correct result. The Court ignored the underly-
ing principles discussed above in its analysis.45 9 The Court undermined
the continued validity of the Central Hudson test in attorney advertising
cases by paying the test short shrift.460 Regulating agencies will now
need to establish rules and regulations furthering important state inter-
ests specifically in the area of direct-target mail attorney advertising.46'
Yet, the Central Hudson test is still valid authority since it has never
455. See supra notes 344-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of overreaching decep-
tive practices and the rationale for regulating certain types of attorney advertising/
solicitations.
456. See supra notes 312-73 and accompanying text.
457. See supra note 417 to infra note 461 and accompanying text for a general discussion of
the Central Hudson test as applied to Shapero.
458. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 312-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underlying
principles.
460. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921.
461. See infra notes 463-502 and accompanying text for a proposal on how states might
regulate after Shapero. These regulations achieve some control over direct-mail solicitation of
potential clients by regulating the communication in a less restrictive manner and by sanction-
ing unprofessional conduct.
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been overruled and is still applied in commercial speech contexts.462 The
application of the four-part test remains important to validate state regu-
lations. The Court should not stray from the clear guidance Central
Hudson provides.
V. PROPOSAL
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,a63 the Court's decision pro-
hibited only absolute bans of direct-mail solicitation. 4 The Court ex-
pressly left the door open for bar associations and states to regulate
attorney direct-mail solicitation short of an absolute ban.46 This propo-
sal suggests four nonexclusive direct-target mail regulations. First, state
or local bar associations should establish their own pre-approval system
for reviewing proposed direct-mail letters. Second, mandatory disclosure
requirements should be promulgated requiring: identification of the cor-
respondence as an advertisement; disclosure of the state attorney discipli-
nary agency; and, an explanation of how the recipient's name and legal
problem were discovered. Third, to protect privacy concerns, letters
should only be sent to verifiable addresses through certified return receipt
mail. Finally, in personal injury/wrongful death practice, potential
plaintiffs may be solicited only following a brief holding period.
Reasonable time, place and manner regulations are firmly rooted in
noncontent-based controls available for all commercial speech.4 66 It fol-
lows, that even after Shapero, the first amendment permits regulating the
462. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (Central Hudson
test applied to validate ban on casino advertising in Puerto Rico); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (four-part test invalidated law prohibiting mailing of adver-
tisements for contraceptives).
463. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
464. Id. at 1923.
465. Id. at 1923-24. The Court stated:
To be sure, a state agency or bar association that reviews solicitation letters might
have more work than one that does not. But "[ojur recent decisions involving com-
mercial speech have been grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial
information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the cost of
distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the
harmless from the harmful."
Id. at 1924 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)).
466. See generally R. ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.47; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972) (anti-noise ordinance prohibiting loud disturbances near school not violative
of first amendment as regulation content neutral and designed to further significant govern-
mental interest-preventing disruption of class work); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (burning draft card not protected speech, but valid manner restriction). But see
Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (restriction on "for sale"
sign invalidated because concerned content, not time, place or manner). Traditionally, com-
mercial speech is afforded less constitutional protection than other forms of speech. Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
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manner in which direct-target mail advertising is conducted. This propo-
sal suggests to state and local jurisdictions permissible regulations for
direct-target mail advertising which will prevent deception, privacy inva-
sions, protect professional ethics and withstand constitutional
scrutiny.467
A. Preapproval of Direct-target Mail Solicitation
One approach would require the soliciting attorney to obtain prior
approval before sending solicitation letters.4 68 This regulation could op-
erate in a manner similar to the screening mechanism established by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for proxy solicitation.4 69 Under a
similar type of screening mechanism, an attorney would be required to
fie a copy of his or her solicitation letter with a committee of the bar.
The committee would then review the letter, make any necessary
changes, and return the letter to the attorney for re-drafting. Preap-
proval has been formally criticized for the difficulty in implementing an
efficient system.470 Several states, in fact, have had difficulties imple-
menting preapproval systems. For example, one bar association required
preapproval for each individually personalized letter sent in a mass mail-
ing.471 The costs of such efforts were high and implementation quite dif-
ficult. Nevertheless, such a system is workable.
First, the fees paid for the pre-approval service could fund the ad-
ministration process. The costs, however, could be covered by requiring
that every time an attorney utilizes a bar association's preapproval serv-
ices, a reasonable administrative fee may be charged. Most letters will
easily comply with the state's preapproval requirements because the stan-
dards could be published by the regulating agency for reference. Those
that do not meet minimum standards could be returned to the soliciting
attorney for redrafting. Larger state bar associations could delegate du-
ties to smaller regional bar associations.472
The administrative burden on attorneys wishing to solicit by mail
467. See supra notes 341-64 for a discussion of unethical and deceptive practices.
468. See generally Perschbacher & Hamilton, Reading Beyond the Labels: Regulation of
Lawyers' Targeted Direct Mail Advertising, 58 U. CoLO. L. REv. 255, 274-78 (1987).
469. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1988).
470. Coyle, Was Direct Mail the Last Taboo?, Nat'l L.J., June 27, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
471. Id. Florida Bar adopted a preapproval program yet immediately encountered
problems when one large law firm undertook a mass direct-mailing campaign. Id.
472. In some states it is not uncommon for local or regional bar associations initially to bear
the responsibility of discipline and attorney regulations. See e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 356 (1977). The disciplinary charges were originally heard by a local committee
appointed by the state bar association. Id.
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would not be great. A single form letter could be preapproved. Other
attorneys soliciting on a narrower basis may choose a single form letter
that could be used for a number of purposes. Still others could select
personalized letters for each potential client, and comply with the filing
requirements every time they solicit. Finally, the bar association could
provide a form letter that has been preapproved and intended for uni-
form use.
In the end, a preapproval procedure would not only protect the pub-
lic, but would shield the attorney from unwarranted and burdensome
disciplinary complaints stemming out of the direct-mail solicitation.
B. Mandatory Disclosure Requirements
A second regulatory approach would focus on disclosure. Disclo-
sure requirements, "reasonably related to the [s]tate's interest in prevent-
ing deception of consumers" are acceptable under the first
amendment.473 The suggested disclosure requirements for direct-target
mail solicitations are: (1) identifying the direct-mail solicitation as an
advertisement; (2) naming the appropriate agency for filing complaints;
and (3) explaining how the recipient's name was obtained by the lawyer.
Under the first requirement, each letter sent to a targeted individual
should be conspicuously identified as an advertisement carrying no legal
obligation. This would limit, but not remove, the overpowering effect an
attorney's letter may have on its recipient. 7 a Under the second require-
ment, the letter should explain which state or local agency regulates at-
torneys, and how a recipient can complain to the appropriate agency
concerns arising out of the receipt of the letter.47- If the potential client
is instructed on how to complain, they could always register their dis-
pleasure with the regulating agency, or even directly with the soliciting
attorney. The letter also would clearly identify the role of the attorney
who sends the solicitation.476
The direct-mail letter could disclose how the attorney learned of the
473. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
474. See supra notes 357-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of how overpowering
an attorney's letter can be.
475. For example, in California letters received from a collections agency must state that
the collector is regulated by the Department of Consumer Affairs and provide an address and
phone number for reporting complaints or inquiries. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.12 (West 1985).
Also, when dealing with consumers of an electronic commerce service, such as a television
shopping service, the service must disclose the appropriate regulatory agency with which to
lodge complaints against the merchant. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.3 (West Supp. 1989).
476. See In Re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985), where the solicitation was claimed to have come from a disinter-
ested committee, but in reality originated from the soliciting attorney.
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recipient's name and specific legal problem.477 For example, the corre-
spondence could indicate that the legal problem is a matter of public
record. Additionally, the correspondence would require the soliciting at-
torney to indicate that he or she has no special knowledge of the poten-
tial client's specific legal problem, but that the attorney has a knowledge
of that area of law. This requirement would assure future privacy by
providing the recipient an opportunity in some circumstances to request
his or her name not be released to the public.478 There may even be some
circumstances where contacting a potential client through permissive
means is such an invasion of privacy that a temporary absolute ban is
warranted.47 9 In these situations intrusions on privacy interests of a
targeted recipient must be weighed against the attorney's first amend-
ment interests.48°
Of course, the potential client's name and legal problem may be dis-
covered only through permissible means. Thus, another goal of these
proposed regulations is to prevent an overreaching soliciting attorney
from employing illegal methods of locating potential clients.481 The let-
ter should state precisely how the information was ascertained, prevent-
ing the attorney from successfully employing improper methods. These
requirements also ensure that if an attorney has received a name through
illegal means, a paper trail will remain for use by an investigating disci-
plinary agency.
477. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924. The Shapero Court recommended that the reviewing
agency require that "the lawyer ... explain briefly how she discovered the fact." Id.
478. Some records, even if they are government property, may not be released to the general
public, even under state and federal freedom of information acts. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1986) (Freedom of Information Act). See also supra notes 344-51 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the privacy issues involved when an attorney or his representative locates some-
one with a specific potentially embarrassing legal problem.
479. In certain situations the gravamen of the situation could produce emotional stress,
impairing the ability of the recipient to make logical or well-informed decisions. In these nar-
row circumstances, a limited and temporary ban may be approved.
480. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1951) overruled on other grounds,
Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
481. Attorneys may not utilize illegal practices such as capping to obtain clients. See supra
text accompanying note 350. Other illegal means would include unlawfully obtaining records
of potential clients by breaching public secrecy acts. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Freedom of
Information Act prohibits the public disclosure of records involving public and private
secrets). Breaching privacy privileges between a patient and a physician could result in liabil-
ity. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West 1966 & West Supp. 1989) (Evidence Code of Califor-
nia prohibits disclosure of privileged communications between a patient and his physician).
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C. Guaranteeing Only the Targeted Recipient Receive the
Direct-Mail Solicitation
It is important that direct-mail correspondence reach only the
targeted recipient. There is a possibility of embarrassment to the recipi-
ent if an attorney's direct-mail solicitation falls into the wrong hands.48
Legal matters may involve private issues such as an arrest,483 or mone-
tary difficulties, including filing for bankruptcy.484 If a communication
from an attorney offering representation were received and read by some-
one other than the intended recipient, the potential client's privacy has
been invaded, and the individual might feel humiliation and
embarrassment.
To reduce these problematic issues, bar associations or other agen-
cies could require that the soliciting attorney send the correspondence
only to a verifiable home address. Verification can be as simple as check-
ing an accident or arrest report, or it may be more involved. To make
absolutely certain that only the potential client receives the correspon-
dence, a regulation could require that the correspondence be sent by cer-
tified mail with return receipt requested, to be signed and completed only
by the addressee. These and other regulations would ensure the commu-
nication from an attorney is only received by the potential client, and
could reduce the possibility that others would receive the
correspondence.
The goal of regulations such as these are to reduce potential privacy
invasions. If only the individual with the particular legal problem re-
ceives the attorney's solicitation, the potential for substantive privacy in-
vasions is reduced.4 5  Therefore, the intent of the regulating agency
would be to make a targeted direct-mail correspondence just that-
targeted and direct. It is difficult to prevent all potential privacy inva-
sions; these proposed regulations, however, would succeed in constitu-
tionally protecting many of these interests.
482. See, e.g., Leoni v. State Bar of Cal., 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423
(1985), summarily dismissed, 455 U.S. 1001 (1986) (direct-target mail solicitation offering ad-
vice concerning filing of bankruptcy intercepted by complainant's employer).
483. See Cohen, Direct Mail Legal Pitches Get Big Boost, Wall St. J., July 5, 1988, § 2, at
21, cols. 3-6 (attorney looked through police reports of arrests to locate potential clients for
sending direct-mail solicitation).
484. See supra text accompanying note 482.
485. Leoni, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985), summarily dismissed,
455 U.S. 1001 (1986). In Leoni, attorneys sent 250,000 direct-mail solicitation letters to de-
fendants in pending civil suits. Id. at 615-16, 704 P.2d at 186-87, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
Some recipients' letters were intercepted and read by others. Id. at 620, 704 P.2d at 189, 217
Cal. Rptr. at 429. The state court struck down the regulation. Id. at 624, 704 P.2d at 192, 217
Cal. Rptr. at 432.
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D. Regulating Personal Injury Client Solicitation
Personal injury tort practice is a specific area in need of regula-
tion.486 This specialty has been identified with particular concern from
the earliest case protecting attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona."' Following an accident or injury, the victims or their families
may "find their mailbox stuffed with letters from lawyers. '4 88 In one
case, for example, following a mass disaster in a state that permitted the
practice of direct-mail solicitation, the victims' families were inundated
with letters following the incident.489 The proliferation of a practice so
intrusive on personal privacy at a time when the recipient is most suscep-
tible to deception has been the subject of Supreme Court scrutiny and
warrants special regulation. 9 '
One suggested regulation in this area involved a "cooling off" pe-
riod during which the potential client could rescind a retainer agreement
that evolved from direct-mail solicitation.491 This approach, however, is
problematic because the attorney may be entitled to the fair value of serv-
ices rendered, and the attorney may be reluctant to commence working
for the client until the period has passed.49 2
A more even-handed regulation could be to entirely prohibit any
attorney from utilizing direct-mail soliciting for a brief period following
the injury. This would allow the victim or the family to recover, gain
composure and face the situation's legal complexity. In addition, the
regulation would help ensure that the attorney most qualified and com-
petent is retained, not a lawyer who successfully beats the competition in
issuing solicitation letters. This type of regulation-a short-term ban-
would be upheld because it is not absolute, but rather an evenly adminis-
tered time and manner restriction.493
The four general areas of proposed regulation-(l) preapproval of
486. Coyle, supra note 470, at 3, col. 1.
487. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
488. Lawry, Litigation Ethics, Solicitation by Mail, 11 LrIGATION, No. 3, 51 (1985).
489. In Re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert
denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
490. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449-54 (1978).
491. See Perschbacher & Hamilton, supra note 468, at 273.
492. Id. The practice of rescinding an attorney-client retainer agreement is problematic
because the attorney may have worked on the case and is entitled to the value of the time
spent. Additionally, the attorney may be reluctant to work diligently on the matter until after
the "cooling off" period has passed. Id.
493. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (anti-noise ordinance prohibited
picketing near school in session permissible time, place and manner regulation); see also R.
ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 20.47 at 235-61.
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all direct-target mail solicitation, (2) disclosure requirements, 4 94 (3) di-
rection of the correspondence only to the addressee-potential client, and
(4) special requirements imposed on personal injury/wrongful death
cases-all would survive the four-part Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York test.495 The first three
prongs496 are easily met.4 9 7 There exists a substantial state interest in
regulating commercial speech and protecting the public from potentially
deceptive practices.4 9 The regulations directly advance the substantial
state interest in protecting the public from overreaching, misleading and
potentially deceptive attorney practices.499
More importantly, the proposed regulations also neatly fit into the
final critical step of the Central Hudson four-part test because they are no
more extensive than necessary to accomplish the states' goals. 500 They
permit truthful, non-misleading targeted-mail solicitation; thus, they are
carefully drawn so as not to infringe upon the advertising attorney's first
amendment privilege. Moreover, these regulations are designed to
achieve many of the underlying goals articulated by proponents of the
absolute ban in Shapero, without violating the first amendment.501
The proposed regulations and disclosure requirements are not meant
to be exclusive. Some jurisdictions may conclude that a particular prac-
tice area warrants more extensive regulation. Other states may even tem-
porarily preclude direct-mail solicitation in special circumstances where
the state interest is so great that only a temporary absolute ban is effec-
tive in advancing that interest.502 However, these proposed regulations
do provide protections to the public while avoiding an infringement of an
attorney's first amendment rights.
494. The four subsets of disclosure requirements are: (1) identification of the correspon-
dence as an advertisement; (2) identification of the regulating agency and how to report an
attorney; (3) identification of the attorney who has sent the targeted-mail solicitation; and (4)
identification of how the attorney learned of the potential or actual legal problem. See supra
notes 473-81 and accompanying text.
495. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
496. See supra notes 422-45 and accompanying text.
497. See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
498. See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
499. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
500. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
501. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
502. A temporary, yet absolute ban can be thought of as a time, place or manner restriction,
and under appropriate circumstances, be upheld as not violating the Constitution. Grayned v.




The history of attorney advertising is marked with ethical and con-
stitutional conflicts.50 3 Ethically, the attorney is obliged to place his or
her client's interests ahead of all other concerns."° Advertising and
soliciting present unethical attorneys an opportunity to engage in decep-
tive practices for pecuniary gain and to invade potential clients' pri-
vacy.505 Thus, the organized bar and regulating agencies must be
permitted to promulgate reasonable regulations to eliminate deceptive
practices.
Constitutionally, attorney advertising is a form of commercial
speech. As such, it receives limited protection by the first amendment.
50 6
The Supreme Court has crafted a well established, four-part test to deter-
mine whether the first amendment protects a particular commercial ex-
pression.5 7 In its most recent pronouncement on the subject of attorney
advertising, the 1988 case of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,50 8 the
Supreme Court of the United States struck down Kentucky's absolute
ban on direct-target mail solicitation under the first amendment. 50 9 In
overturning the rule, however, the Court failed to apply its well estab-
lished four-part commercial speech test.510
By failing to apply the test, the Court has put into question whether
many states' regulations addressing direct-target mail solicitation remain
viable. The Court has therefore undermined the states' efforts to ensure
ethical attorney conduct. Since the Court did not overrule the four-part
test, states should continue to rely on it for guidance in regulating direct-
target mail solicitation.
Under the guidance of the four-part test, and yet consistent with
Shapero, states may implement time, place and manner restrictions such
as: (1) requiring preapproval of all direct-target mail solicitation; (2) im-
posing disclosure requirements; (3) requiring that the correspondence is
directed only to the potential client; and (4) in the personal injury field,
imposing a special "holding period" before solicitation is permitted.
503. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertising could not be
categorically banned under the first amendment).
504. MODEL RULES, supra note 153, Rule 1.7.
505. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 (1978).
506. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
507. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
508. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
509. Id. at 1921-24.
510. See supra notes 418-55 for a discussion of how the Central Hudson four-part test was
not applied and how it should have been applied in Shapero.
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Although these restrictions are consistent with Shapero, the Court
should take the first opportunity it possibly can to clear the air regarding
the viability of rules regarding direct-target mail solicitation.
Brian S. Kabateck*
* This Note is dedicated to Roxanne Hampton, my wife, companion and confidant and
to our parents and friends for their support during my law school ordeal.
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